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Abstract 
In 1993 with the entry  into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union, for 
the first time, formally  institutionalized foreign policy cooperation in its Treaties. 
Thence, the Treaties governing the foreign policy of the Union has undergone no 
less than four reforms, introducing theoretically  interesting institutional 
innovations. Despite this, academia has largely turned its attention towards the 
capability and capacity of the European Union of being a fully fledged foreign 
policy actor. Research which, with the formalization and institutionalization of the 
Union’s foreign policy, has become irrelevant since empirical data establish that 
the Union, at an increasing rate, is producing foreign policies. With this in mind, 
research on the capacity of the Union, I argue, is rendered obsolete. Instead, this 
thesis place the policy in the spotlight and seek to investigate the impact the 
institutionalization and Treaty  reforms has had on shaping and changing the 
course of the Union’s foreign policy. 
 In order to materialize this ambition a small-n comparative case study  
design has been deployed alongside three theoretical perspectives which point 
towards distinct institutional mechanisms that conceivably could shape and 
change the direction of the Union’s policies. In terms of policy, the Union’s policy 
towards the Middle East peace process has been selected to test and investigate 
whether the theoretical promises congrue with empiricism.
 The results demonstrate that the institutional constraints established in the 
Treaties de facto shaped the Union’s policy towards the peace process. However, 
in terms of changing the course of the Union’s policy there are no major empirical 
observations that suggests that Treaty reform has had any implications 
whatsoever. 
Words: 24 539 (incl. references) 
Key words: Treaty reform, policy, policy  change, institutions, structures, CFSP, 
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Abbreviations 
CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy
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1. Introduction & Research Question
”Europe is an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm”
       Mark Eyskens, Belgian Foreign 
Minister, 1991
The above quote represents Mark Eyskens perception of the European Union’s 
(EU) role in the international political system. Perhaps Eyskens was right in 
judging the EU a political dwarf in 1991 since the ”European Political 
Cooperation” (EPC), established in the 1970’s, had no role for, nor involvement 
of, formal European institutions (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 45). 
However, in 1993 with the entry  into force of the Maastricht Treaty, foreign policy 
was for the first time formally  institutionalized and incorporated in the EU’s 
political system (ibid: 50). Thenceforth, the institutional structure, or Treaties 
which governs the manner the Union’s foreign policy is formulated, has been 
reformed four times. In 1999 the Amsterdam Treaty  introduced inter alia the High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security  Policy  participating in the 
formulation of the Union’s foreign policies. Moreover, the Nice Treaty established 
a new permanent body directly involved in the definition of foreign policies. 
Despite these structural and institutional innovations, scholarly inquiries has 
primarily  focused on determining to which extent the European Union is capable 
of being a fully fledged foreign policy ”actor” (See e.g. Sjöstedt, 1977;  Jupille & 
Caporasso, 1998; Bretherton & Vogler, 2006) and the implications reforms have 
had on the foreign policy capacity of the Union (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). 
However, the question of the Union’s capability as a foreign policy actor has 
during the past twenty years been rendered obsolete. This argument stems from 
the observation that ever since the formal institutionalization of foreign policy 
cooperation in 1993, the Union’s capacity to produce foreign policy output has 
dramatically increased over the years. ”Graph 1”, presented below, supports such 
a conclusion and clearly demonstrate that the question of the Union being a 
capable foreign policy actor is rendered obsolete.
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 Thus, rather than focusing on capacity, it would be more relevant to research 
the consequences the Treaties, concerning the institutionalization and reform of 
the foreign policy structure has had for the Union’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy  (CFSP). This is a much more promising area of research for two reasons. 
First, as established above, the Union have the capacity  to be a foreign policy 
actor since there is an output of foreign policy. Secondly, an inquiry  into how 
structures affect policies is highly relevant since scholars argue that  structures 
have the potential to exert an impact on individuals’ behavior whom are involved 
in policymaking, thus potentially affecting policy (Carlsnaes 2012: 
113-114;Wiener, 2006: 39). Basing my approach in line with this assumption, and 
as long as the European Union is based on Treaties, the Treaties must also be 
deemed to have the potential to impact the different policymaking actors involved 
in the formulation of the Union’s foreign policy, thus hypothetically  shaping the 
Union’s policies. 
 Following the above argumentation, an essential part of this thesis will be to 
explain and  theoretically  establish how the Treaties can shape and change the 
Union’s policy. Thus, it of essence to deploy a set of theories which can point 
towards which structural mechanisms that hypothetically could form and change 
the course of the Union’s policies. Institutional theories have long been utilized to 
understand and explain the role of structures in assessing their impact on politics 
(Hall & Taylor, 1996: 936; Peters, 2012: 1-3). It is therefore institutional theories 
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shall inform and guide the analysis of this thesis. However, since the concept 
”institution” have come to mean a variety of different things to different people at 
different points in time (Peters, 2012: 47). In this paper I have decided to use three 
theoretical perspectives stemming from two distinct meta-theoretical perspectives 
to inform the analysis of how the Treaties and their respective reform has shaped 
and potentially changed the Union’s policy.
 To be able to move further down the ”ladder of abstraction” and concretize I 
intend to test the theoretical claims on one of the Union’s policies. Therefore, the 
policy towards the Middle East peace process shall be used as to portray if the 
Treaties have shaped or changed policy. The peace process provides an excellent 
case to apply  the theories and make an inquiry into. This is since the conflict was 
among the first issues making its way  onto the agenda during the 1970s when the 
EPC was in place and collectively debated in terms of European foreign policy 
(Peters, 2010: 511; Mueller, 2013: 1). Today the Middle Eastern conflict  and the 
resolution of it  is still one of the most important foreign policy  priorities for the 
European Union and the rest of the world, thus making it an intriguing case to 
determine whether the Treaties have shaped the policy  over the years the Union 
have actively pursued a policy towards the process. Furthermore, research 
concerning the Union’s involvement in the Middle East has to a greater extent also 
been focused on determining to what degree the EU could be labelled a foreign 
policy actor (See e.g. Peters, 2010; Musu, 2010; Mueller, 2013) thus there is a 
need to expand the field of research for the Union’s policy towards the process.
 Following the argumentation above I have set for myself and this thesis to 
explore and answer the following research question:
 How has the Treaties and their respective reforms shaped and changed the 
European Union’s policies towards the Middle East peace process?
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1.1 Research Limitation
Considering that  the research question still is broadly formulated it is necessary to 
delimit it further. Since the concept ”institution”, as argued above, can inhibit a 
variety of meanings to different people I have opted to delimit my  research by 
using three theories that  define what an institution is constituted of. These three 
theories will then be used as variables to identify  and explore the dimensions of 
the Treaties that are capable of shaping and changing the European Union’s policy 
towards the Middle East peace process. Hence, the research produced in this paper 
do not give a full account of the meaning of institution but is rather purposefully 
limited to the theoretical variables of interest. 
 Moreover, the thesis is also constrained to one of the policies, the Middle 
East peace process policy, of the European Union which could limit the 
generalizability  of the findings of this thesis. However, as this thesis is primarily 
concerned with the Treaties, the findings of this piece of research could be valid 
for several other foreign policy aspects of the European Union. 
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1.2 Outline
To be able to answer my research question in a structured and understandable 
manner I have divided the thesis into six chapters each with its own set of 
subsections. The first chapter has already introduced the area of research and the 
research question to be answer at  the end of the thesis. Chapter two presents the 
methodological approach adopted and deliberates on the benefits and 
shortcomings of the selected method as well as motivating my choice of cases. 
The third chapter utilize and present the selected theories in order to deduce and 
build hypotheses in the quest of operationalize the theories, while chapter five 
analyze the Treaties and the Middle East peace process policy  using the 
hypotheses as the base for the analysis. The last chapter, number six, summarize 
and presents the empirical findings in order to provide an answer to the research 
question.
2. Methodology
The purpose of this chapter is to argue for my choice of the selected method, its 
benefits but also limitations. The method utilized in this work is that of the 
qualitative comparative case study which will, in the coming section, be more 
intricately  introduced. Following the introduction of the qualitative case study is 
the presentation of the selected cases that are employed in the analysis of how the 
European Union’s policy in the Middle-Eastern peace process has been shaped or 
changed with Treaty reform. The discussion on how to operationalize the selected 
variables of the study will be deferred to the theoretical considerations as  the 
hypotheses need to be fully developed prior to any attempt of theoretical 
operationalization. 
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2.1 The Comparative Case Study
The selected method in this work is the comparative case study which ”[...] 
examines in rich detail the context and features of two or more instances of 
specific phenomena” (Campbell, 2009: 175). Comparisons can be of both a 
quantitative and qualitative nature and the applied version in this paper shall be 
the qualitative. That is the attempt to understand traits, attributes and 
characteristics of the objects of inquiry (Landman, 2008: 22) which related to this 
thesis means the understanding of which attributes of institutional reform could 
cause policy to change, if it changes at all. 
 The reasons for selecting a small-n comparative case study  are multiple, 
however, one of the most important factors when selecting a methodology for 
conducting a study  is the relationship between the research question/research task 
on the one hand, and the method of choice on the other (Yin, 2009: 10). 
Depending on how the investigator decide to pose a research question as well as 
research tasks, different methodologies may be a better, or be less suitable to, fit 
the specific research agenda developed by the researcher (George & Bennett, 
2005: 6). Further, since experimental and statistical case study models rely on a 
large-N sample of cases to be able to draw inferences and ”the comparative model 
should be resorted to when the number of cases available for analysis is so small 
that cross-tabulating them further in order to establish credible controls is not 
feasible” (Lijphardt, 1971: 684) the small-n case study design seems highly 
suitable for the purpose of investigating how institutional reform of the CFSP 
structure has altered the Union’s policy. This is since the Union has only seen four 
treaty reforms since the CFSP was incorporated, formally, into the EU’s pillar 
structure under the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 
50). The purpose of comparing institutional reform in my case is to establish what 
elements of institutional reform can be said to cause change in the European 
Union’s policy towards the Middle-Eastern peace process, if any change has taken 
place at all.
 In this thesis I have also opted for a small-n case design which call for an 
exploration of such a design’s limitations and benefits. First  and foremost, the 
small-n case study design offers more robustness as the evidence collected from 
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multiple cases is more compelling, at least relatively compared to a single case 
study design  (Yin, 2009: 53). However, case study researchers should also be 
aware that social phenomena may be subject to multiple or complex causality, 
consequently case studies could be capable of producing contingent 
generalizations than perhaps wished for (George & Bennet, 2005: 22). Though 
this might seem as a severe methodological shortcoming there are methods to 
overcome such problems, for instance, the adoption of a multi-variance 
congruence method, discussed below, may aid the investigator to bridge such 
shortcomings.
 Case studies also have the potential to identify new variables or theories 
through the study cases. For instance ”if we ask one question of individuals or 
documents but get an entirely different answer, we may move to develop new 
theories that can be tested through previously unexamined evidence (George & 
Bennet, 2005: 21). However, in case study research there exist one overarching 
issue that needs to be resolved before discussing the issues above any further.
2.2 Case Selection and the Congruence Method
The issue I was referring to when summarizing the previous section that is an 
overarching issue related to the design of any comparative case study is the case 
selection process. This step  is directly linked to one of the potential pitfalls in the 
comparative case methodology, namely selection bias (George & Bennett, 2005: 
24; Seawrigth & Gerring, 2008: 294). The question that logically follow is: how 
can one avoid selection bias? At first sight the promise of random selection seems 
appealing as it produce unbiased samples (Seawright & Gerring, 2008: 295). 
However deeper scrutiny raises concerns regarding the representativeness (ibid: 
295) as well as the control of comparison (George & Bennett, 2005, p  151-2) and 
as such seem to discard the random selection process. Instead Seawright  and 
Gerring (2008) suggests a more purposive style of case selection. That is, the 
purposive selection of cases that fit with the selected research strategy and reflect 
a representative sample and also variation on the dimensions of theoretical interest 
(Seawright & Gerring, 2008: 295-6). Consequently, the method I have selected 
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both as a method of establishing causal relationships within my cases as well as 
my case selection method is part of the ‘Congruence Method’. 
 The fundamental characteristic of the congruence method is that the 
researcher begins by utilizing a single, or multiple theories, and employ these 
theories to deduce explanations or predictions about the outcome in a case or 
cases (George & Bennet, 2005: 181). Accordingly, the primary research objective 
for a study using the congruence method would be to find ”[...] similarities in the 
relative strengths and duration of hypothesized causes and observed 
effects”(George & Bennet, 2005: 183). As it is the ambition in this research thesis 
to hypothesize and explore whether the treaty reform of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy has caused the EU’s policy  to change, I have chosen to apply 
institutional theories and let these guide the selection of my cases. This is quite a 
logic decision considering the attempt to use theory to deduce which institutional 
constraints that could cause a variance in the European Union’s policy. By 
allowing  theory to point to specific causal mechanisms a representative sample 
which also varies in relation to theoretical interest can be achieved. Related to my 
thesis, this means that each respective treaty governing the structure of the 
Common Foreign and Security  Policy needs to be investigated since they could 
embody the specific theoretical mechanisms that hypothetically  could cause 
policy to change. Accordingly, as the Maastricht Treaty was the first to 
incorporate the CFSP into the formal structure of the Union this shall be the 
reference case and starting point of my investigation. From there, I intend to more 
freely let the theories guide the case selection to exclude treaties if they  are of no 
theoretical interest. All this to achieve a purposeful selection of cases. 
 However, as an investigation of the treaties will not be enough to determine 
whether the Union’s policies has changed with each treaty reform, it  is essential to 
include the policy documents with respect to the Middle East peace process that 
were produced under the institutional framework of the respective treaties in 
force. The reason for selecting the Middle East policy for empirical analysis is 
closely connected with the claim in that the Lisbon Treaty  would change the 
course of EU foreign policy. If one contrast this with the argument that the 
member states have throughout the years have had ”[...] different traditions and 
interest in the Middle East [...]” (Musu, 2010: 24) makes the Middle East peace 
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process policy a highly interesting area for inquiry  especially when linked to how 
structures/institutions could alter policy. In addition to analyzing the Treaties I 
have also added four types of supplementary types of documentation. The reason 
for selecting these documents and statements, is that this documentation is able to 
empirically  test the developed hypotheses derived from the institutional theories 
presented below. As already mentioned, I have therefore included seven types of 
documents in order to determine whether the Union’s policy towards the Middle 
East peace process changed due to treaty  reform. The documents are the 
following; 
• European Council Conclusions
• Strategies/Declarations
• Statements of the Quartet/High Representative of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy
• Decisions, Joint Actions, and Common Positions of the Council of the European 
Union
Since the selection of the Decisions and Common Positions of the Council of the 
European Union documents cannot be motivated in the combined theoretical/
operationalization part of the theoretical framework, which the remainder of the 
documents can and will be, I shall briefly explain why  they  constitute an essential 
part of the analysis in the next few sentences. The decisions are an essential part 
of the analysis as they can either confirm or refute whether the hypothesized 
institutional constraints, which with respective Treaty reform has either been 
created or undergone change, have caused policy  to change. Consequently, the 
decisions represent final policy outcome and should thus be able to tell whether 
policy changed due to the institutional constraint. Hence, by  employing this 
blueprint for case selection, and data collection, I should fulfill the two criterion 
for purposive case selection and hence end up with a rigorous strategy for further 
analysis.
 Considering that case selection is not the only phenomena that a case study  
investigator may encounter, during his or her research, I shall further discuss the 
congruence method more intricately. 
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By employing the congruence the researcher first need to establish what causal 
mechanisms the selected theories assume cause change. Secondly, should it be so 
that the outcome of the case ”[...] is consistent with the theory’s prediction, the 
analyst can entertain the possibility  that a causal relationship  may exist” (George 
& Bennet, 2005: 181). However, as the congruence method begin its enquiry 
through the exploration of theory  and deduction of variables, and the fact  that 
social phenomena could be subject  to ‘equifinality’ or ‘multiple causation’, the 
establishment of causal significance and thereby congruity could become a 
problem. The problem could occur as theories ”[...] may focus on the same 
independent variables but point to different causal mechanisms that relate these 
variables to the observed outcome” (ibid: 186) and thereby the congruence 
method may produce inconclusive results. It is, therefore, argued that what  a 
researcher could do is employ a ‘multi-variate’ congruence method whereby the 
researcher includes and deduce a wider scope of potential causal factors and 
explain which of these are competing and complementary  in relation to one 
another (ibid: 188). In this thesis I have, as will be further explicated in the 
theoretical framework, chosen two distinct sets of meta-theories, including sub-
theories, focusing on both formal and informal aspects of what constitute an 
institution. The application of the multi-variate congruence method in this thesis 
should therefore be regarded as an attempt by the author to vanquish the common 
limitation of producing inconclusive results.
 Perhaps most important in small-n designs is the question of replication. 
This is the process whereby the researcher ensures that the cases are comparable. 
According to Yin (2009) this can be achieved in two ways. On the one hand, 
replication can be achieved by selecting cases so that they predict the same 
results, on the other, that they predict contrasting results (ibid: 54). Since the 
congruence method begins with the use of theory to establish predictions and 
expectations about the outcome of the dependent variable, the replicability of my 
cases will be on a same result basis. Thus, as my theories, as we shall explore in 
the coming chapter, all expect policy to change as a result of institutional reform 
replication between the cases, and hence comparability, can be established.
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3. Philosophy of Science - Taking off the Skin 
and Putting on the Sweater
Prior to the discussion of the theoretical framework a confessional remark 
regarding  the framework itself is vital for the reader in order to fully  understand 
the shortcomings present in this thesis. Since I have opted to apply two different 
meta-theoretical perspectives each emanating from a distinct ontological school a 
problem arise. This is since scholars argue that ontologies should be applied  as 
”[...] a skin not a sweater: they  cannot be put on and taken off whenever the 
researcher sees fit” (Marsh & Furlong, 2002: 17). The first ontological perspective 
the thesis employ is a rational choice perspective with its own unique ontological 
reflections. The rational choice ontology depart from the assumption that it is 
individuals and the fact that these individuals strive to maximize the attainment of 
their preferences and thereby  are able to rank them (Ward, 2002: 68). Hence, 
rational choice theories take ”[...] individuals’ preferences, beliefs, and feasible 
strategies as causes of the actions they are likely  to take” (ibid: 70). Related to my 
thesis this means, as will be further elaborated in the theoretical chapters, 
institutions are seen as exogenous to individuals preference formation. 
Correspondingly, rational choice ontologies and theories argue that it is not social 
structures but rather individualism that can explain social phenomena (ibid: 75).
 However, as this is not the sole conception of how institutions affect 
individuals I have also opted for a endogenous institutional perspective. 
Therefore, I intend to take off the rational choice sweater and put on a 
constructivist sweater, an ontological move which might seem dubious. However, 
in normative institutional theory individual‘s preferences are considered to be 
shaped through the participation in institutional life (Peters, 2012: 27). 
Accordingly, institutions must therefore, from the normative institutional point of 
view, be considered as endogenous to individual preference formation. This goes 
in stark contrast to the approach adopted in the rational choice ontology and 
theory  since normative institutional theory  assume a more social ontology 
whereby ”[...] social reality does not fall from heaven, but that  human agents 
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construct and reproduce it through their daily practices” (Risse, 2009: 145). 
Consequently, Risse (2009) comes to the conclusion that:
”[...] [individuals] cannot exist independently from their social environment and 
its collectively shared system of meanings [...] The crucial point is that 
constructivist insist on the mutual constitutiveness  of social structures and agents. 
The social environment [or institutions] in which we find ourselves, defines 
(constitutes) who we are, out identities as social beings” (ibid: 145-6). 
 
 Thus, it assumed from such an ontological perspective that it is the social 
environment, or institutions, that are constitutive as to the formation of individual 
preferences and accordingly is what guide individuals to specific actions.
 The use of two distinct ontologies may  set off a epistemological alarm since 
some epistemological perspectives that  rejects claims made by other perspectives, 
positivism for instance would reject that there exist a socially constructed world 
(Marsh & Furlong, 2002: 22). However, by adopting a comparative case study 
approach that rely on a multi-variance method the parsing of the comparative case 
study ”[...] into contending ‘isms’ does not fit very  well with the emphasis [...] 
scholars have placed on causal explanation via causal mechanisms, which often 
cut across these schools of thought” (George & Bennet, 2005: 128). The approach 
adopted in this thesis explain social phenomena using causal mechanisms, which 
means that the investigator looks for ”[...] unobservable physical, social, or 
psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but 
only in specific context or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to 
other entities ” (ibid:137). This is in line with a realist epistemology that assume 
”that social phenomena/structures do have causal powers, so we can make causal 
statements. However not all social phenomena, and the relationship between 
them, are directly observable. There are deep structures that cannot be observed 
[...]” (Marsh & Furlong, 2002: 31).
 Despite the remark that there exist structures that cannot be observed ”[...] 
positing their existence gives us the best explanation of social action” (ibid: 31). 
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As such making inferences, that is the process deriving an outcome based on 
assumptions about reality, provides the best explanations of social phenomena 
(ibid: 30). Which makes realist a suitable epistemology for the research agenda in 
this thesis, since by using theories deductively it is my aspiration to make 
inferences about which institutional constraints, if changed, could cause a change 
in the European Union’s policy. 
 The realist assumptions have received criticisms from other schools 
especially for their belief in unobservable structures. The positivist  approach has 
long argued that by  assuming this makes the claims of realists untestable and 
therefore also unfalsifiable (ibid: 31). However, these ontological ‘shortcomings’ 
have benefits too. First, it enables the researcher to broaden theoretical 
considerations as to what theoretical mechanisms that hypothetically may cause 
change in policy. Second, a welcome spillover effect from the extension of the 
theoretical framework, is that such an extension allows the investigator, to a 
degree, overcome the complex causation and the congruence methodology  issue 
written of in the methodological chapter.
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4. Theoretical Framework and 
Operationalization 
In this chapter the theoretical foundation for the analysis will be established. By 
initially presenting a problem related to the primacy of cause I then go about 
motivating the theoretical choices made in this thesis. Following the motivation, I 
intend to first present the overarching features the rational-choice metatheoretical 
perspective and consecutive to this present two theoretical perspectives and use 
these to develop two hypotheses regarding what institutional constraints that could 
shape and trigger a change in the European Union’s policy  towards the Middle 
East peace process. Sequential to this will be an inquiry into the constructivist 
metatheory this in the pursuit  of developing a hypothesis stemming from the a 
constructivist subtheory  labelled normative institutionalism. Nonetheless, before 
giving an account of which theories I have selected and what motivational factors 
lie behind the selection, it is necessary to have a brief discussion concerning 
which out of two phenomena the researcher should consider the primacy of cause 
when attempting to investigate policy. This is a problem more commonly known 
as the ‘agency-structure problem’, which;
 
 ”[...] focuses on the empirical claim that human agents [individuals] and social 
structures [institutions] are fundamentally interrelated, and hence that 
explanations of social actions [policies] must incorporate both” (Carlsnaes, 2012: 
125)
The problem starts materializing whenever the investigator treat individuals and 
structures, when both are present, as separate phenomena without any 
interactional links. Thus, by  complementing the rational choice theories on 
institutions with a constructivist perspective which allow for the mutual 
constitutiveness of both agents and structures the agency-structure problem can, 
more or less, be overcome. Further on this note, as will become evident in the 
theoretical parts I do not  separate structures from individuals completely as the 
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rational choice theories assume that structures do affect individual action, perhaps 
one more intricately than the other. 
 The theories utilized stem from, as presented above, two meta-theoretical 
ontologies, rational-choice and constructivism. Rational choice institutionalism is 
represented by the theoretical perspectives considering institutions as rules and 
contractual relationships. The constructivist perspective is represented by 
normative institutionalism.  These were not selected at  random but on the premise 
of two main arguments. First, as we shall see in the subsequent chapters, the 
theories contrast  each other, which makes them, from a comparative perspective, 
interesting. This is because of their differing ontological points of departure, 
pointing to different as well as several institutional constraints that could change 
policy of both a formal and informal nature. Second, as mentioned in the 
methodology, since social phenomena may be caused by  more than one causal 
mechanism. It thus become important due to the utilization of the congruence 
method, to expand the theoretical framework. Accordingly, the selection of the 
theories should therefore be seen as an attempt to overcome the limitations of the 
methodology.
 Each sub-chapter within the theoretical framework begins with a 
presentation of the fundamental metatheoretical features of each theory. The 
chapter then moves on, utilizing the three selected theories, to deduce and 
hypothesize which institutional features, according to the theories, that shapes and 
could change the policy of the EU. 
 A last note to the reader, the term individual(s) is used throughout the 
theoretical framework and should be understood as the different actors involved, 
which will be discussed in the analytical part  of this thesis, in the foreign 
policymaking machinery of the EU.
15
4.1 Rational Choice Institutionalism
The overall goal and aim of this chapter it  to define what an institution constitute 
according to the rational choice literature. Furthermore, the chapter also seeks to 
deduce two hypotheses, from the rational school, regarding what institutional 
constraints that hypothetically may trigger a change in policy. This is far from a 
simple task as the rational choice institutional theory can be considered an meta-
theory  (Pollack, 2006: 32) containing a variety of different analytical levels and 
theoretical view-points. Therefore, I shall introduce rational choice 
institutionalism by  presenting two ways of thinking about institutions from the 
rational perspective. Second, as the overall goal and aim of this thesis is to explore 
whether the Lisbon Treaty has changed the Common Foreign and Security policy 
an exploration of the modus operandi of institutions according to the rational 
choice literature on institutions is also a must. An inquiry  of the operational nature 
of institutions are necessary as this would further enlighten what  features of an 
institution that can be said to regulate the interaction between individual and 
structure. Following the exploration of the operational nature of institutions I shall 
move on and examine what institutional constraints that may trigger change by 
employing two theoretical sub-theories inherent to the rational choice school. 
From these perspectives I intend to develop two hypotheses regarding what 
institutional constraints that may cause a change in the foreign policy  of the 
European Union, all this to be able to test whether the Lisbon Treaty has brought 
about such change and to be able to test whether change in policy has taken place. 
 Within the rational choice school of thought two conceptions of thinking 
about institutions has developed over the years. These two perspectives views 
institutions as either exogenous or endogenous to individual’s preference 
formation (Shepsle, 2006: 24; Weingast, 1996: 167). 
 The latter perspective, views institutions as a pre-given phenomena, or 
exogenous, to political action (Shepsle, 2008: 24). As institutions are pre-given to 
political action they are thus to be considered as ”the rules of the game in a 
society or, more formally, [...] the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction” (North cited in Shepsle, 1990: 3). An institution would therefore be 
regarded as an externally derived constraint upon individuals and their actions, as 
the institution would establish the bounds of acceptability  for human interactions. 
Hence, any study assuming that that institutions are exogenous to political action 
would have to concentrate the analysis on the effects and consequences these 
institutions have on political action (Peters, 2012: 59-60; Weingast, 1996: 167). 
 The second interpretation regard institutions as endogenous, that is ”the 
rules of the game in this view are provided by the players themselves; they are 
simply  the ways in which the players want to play”. (Shepsle, 2006: 25). This 
perspective assume that the actors within the system have the capability  to shape 
institutional design and arrangement depending on their role within the institution 
(ibid: 25). Consequently, the institutional arrangements become the focal point for 
analysis. Therefore, rather than focusing on the effects of an institution, and the 
effects of the rules of the game, the endogenous perspective emphasizes why 
institutions are formed and shaped in a particular manner (Peters, 2012: 60). This 
division of institutional conceptions does not necessarily pose a problem but 
rather emphasizes specific features of an institution that should be the subject  of 
further research (ibid: 60) On a similar note, to be able to achieve a focused 
analysis that  relate to my research objectives I have chosen to view institutions, in 
the rational segment of this thesis, as exogenous and as a consequence of this on 
the institutional effects. Thus, what needs to be explored next is the operational 
nature of institutions, this to be able to better understand what features, of an 
institution, that may cause an effect and change in policy outcome. 
 To some it might seem dubious to utilize a rational perspective when 
analyzing how structures and individuals interact. The skepticism is caused by a 
key assumption inherent in the rational models namely  that individuals are the 
central actors in political activity (ibid: 51), and that  these individuals have a fixed 
set of preferences and behave instrumentally to maximize to the acquisition of 
these preferences (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 945), something also known as the logic 
of consequentiality (Pollack, 2010: 24). However, if we place these individuals in 
a collective setting, e.g. the European Union, and they still seek to maximize their 
own utility this egoistic behavior will most likely produce collective action 
dilemmas. The collective action dilemmas can also be defined as ”instances when 
individuals acting to maximize the attainment of their own preferences are likely 
to produce an outcome that is collectively  sub-optimal” (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 
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945). This is since, in a collective setting, an outcome could hypothetically  be 
found that leave one of the individuals better of without  making anyone else 
worse off. Typical examples of collective action dilemmas include the ‘Tragedy of 
the Commons’ and ‘Prisoners Dilemma’. The solution to these collective action 
problems, it is argued, is the creation of institutions (Peters, 2012: 52). This 
because institutions, according to the rational perspective, have the potential to 
produce ‘collective rationality’. That is, in a collective setting ”[...] individuals 
realize that institutional rules also constrain their competitors in whatever game of 
maximization those competitors believe themselves to be involved in” (Weingast 
cited in Peters, 2012: 50). The constraints within the institution functions as to 
guide the individuals’ respective behavior and also sets the boundaries of 
acceptable behavior (Peters, 2012: 50-51). Further, by setting the boundaries of 
acceptability the constraints limits individual’s quest of maximizing the 
attainment of their preferences by:
”[...] affecting the range and sequence of alternatives on the choice-agenda or by 
providing information and enforcement mechanisms that reduce uncertainty about 
the corresponding behavior of others and allow ‘gains from exchange’ thereby 
leading actors toward particular calculations and potentially better social 
[collective] outcomes” (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 945). 
Based on the above, rational choice theory  can therefore be said to define 
institutions as two overarching concepts. On the one hand institutions create a set 
of incentives, e.g. predictability  about others behavior and collective gains. On the 
other hand, institutions are defined by a set of constraints.
 The investigation of the modus operandi of institutions, according to the 
rational choice literature, has led me to draw the following concluding remarks. 
Institutions are created to overcome collective action problems and have the 
potential to overcome these issues by creating both incentives, and constraints. 
Institutional action is therefore to be judged as rational since the incentives and 
constraints inherent in the institutions allow individuals to understand that 
collectively they can achieve their preferences more effectively while their own 
and competitors behavior is constrained. 
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 In the context of this thesis, what is of interest for the deduction and 
development of hypotheses are the constraining nature of institutions, this is 
because adopting a focus on incentives would lead the investigator to ask a 
different research question(s) than that posed in this thesis. As argued above, 
incentives  created by  institutions could be seen as the bypassing of collective 
action dilemmas, thus a research question would concern ”why” do individuals 
seek institutional action rather than ”how” do institutions shape and change 
policy. Constraints are more of an interest  since the constraining institution 
regulate the range of allowed alternatives which will ultimately  come to affect  the 
possible collective outcomes. Based on the above exploration an overarching 
hypothesis can be developed:
H1: if a constraint mechanism exist, change or is created, then the ‘rules’ have 
changed. Consequently, individuals must recalculate and rationally respond to the 
new constraints imposed, hypothetically leading the individuals towards 
particular calculations shaping and/or changing the course of policy
 Despite the successful theoretical deduction and development of a 
hypothesis relating to what institutional features rational-choice institutionalism 
would be of interest, there is a dimension which needs further explication. To be 
able to operationalize and empirically test the above hypothesis I need to 
theoretically understand how a constraint can be defined in line with the above 
rational assumptions. Consequently, I shall dedicate the two subsequent chapters, 
utilizing two rational-choice institutional sub-theories, to elaborate which 
institutional constraints that can be accredited to shape or cause change to policy. 
Thus, hypothesis one should not be considered a testable hypothesis but rather an 
overarching guiding the development of the following two hypotheses. The two 
selected perspectives were not selected at random but rather purposefully to fit the 
greater research objective. The first perspective considers institutional constraints 
as formal rules that govern the repetitive behavior between individuals in policy 
situations. The second theoretical angle views institutions as contractual 
relationships and go beyond the governed relationship of individuals to also 
include inter-institutional relationships (Peters, 2012: 56). The reason for 
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including a perspective that also focuses on inter-institutional relationships is due 
to that  CFSP policy-making does not only  include member states but also, as will 
be further investigated in the analytical part, other institutions. Because of this, it 
is highly relevant to consider these contractual relationships as phenomena that 
could shape the Union’s policy. 
4.1.1 Institutions as Rules
The first conceptualization on what type of constraints an institution impose on 
individual maximization recognize institutions as a set  of rules. What constitute a 
‘rule’ might seem rather straightforward, however, as this analysis progress the 
conclusion that can be drawn is that this is not the case. Ostrom (1986) refers to 
institutional rules as ”[...] prescriptions commonly known and used by a set of 
participants to order repetitive interdependent relationships” (Ostrom, 1986: 5). 
These prescriptions are references as to what actions that are required, prohibited 
and permitted  within the institutional setting (ibid: 5). By  arguing for rules as 
prescriptions of what actions are required, prohibited, and permitted the concept 
of rules is quite weak. This is because other theoretical perspectives, such as 
normative institutionalism, refer to their institutional constraints as prescriptive 
references which cause similar behavior among individuals in groups too (Weiner, 
2006: 42-3 see also Peters, 2012: 52-3). 
 Accordingly there is a need to further distinguish the rational perspective on 
rules. It is therefore as Ostrom (1996) further argue that rules are the implicit  or 
explicit  attempt of individuals to achieve order and reduce uncertainty of the 
behavior of the set of individuals part of the institutional setting (Ostrom, 1996: 
5). As individuals can be accredited to the creation of rules, individuals must 
therefore also be able to subject the very same rules to change. As noted by 
Ostrom (1996) changing rules in reality might be difficult, theoretically rules can 
be changed.  However, the prescriptive and changing nature of rules alone is not a 
sufficient condition for rules to function as a constraint upon individuals. For rules 
to operate as a constraint they  also need to have prescriptive force or be 
enforceable (ibid: 6; Peters, 2012: 53). Formal laws may  therefore not be equated 
with rules initially, however if there is a mechanism by which individuals can be 
held accountable formal laws should be considered rules (Ostrom, 1996: 6). This 
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is since without enforcement there is no guarantee that the rules that order the 
relationship  between individuals are being adhered to. Without an enforcement 
paradigm attached to rules individuals in a collective setting would attempt, as the 
fundamental assumption in rational theory  tell us, to be egoistic and realize the 
maximal attainment of their own preferences. This behavior would as a 
consequence cause the same collective action problems and outcomes, as 
presented in the previous chapter.
 By utilizing Ostrom’s definition of prescriptive force, or enforcement, we 
encounter an issue that needs resolution before proceeding to the development of 
a hypothesis. The issue regards whether the enforcement mechanism should be 
regarded as formal, informal, or perhaps, both? In their article, ”Dynamics of 
Institutional Change in the EU”, Stacey and Rittberger (2003) distinguish 
informal and formal enforcement by arguing that formal enforcement entails 
holding individuals legally accountable by a third party, e.g. the European Court 
of Justice (Stacey  & Rittberger, 2003: 861). Informal enforcement, on the other 
hand, encompass only political sanctions, e.g. naming and shaming, carrying 
negligible legal force (Stacey & Rittberger, 2003: 861). Hence, informal 
enforcement seems to be of little value when it comes to making sure that rules 
are followed since it  offers no direct way to correct or alter the behavior of 
individuals breaking the institutional rules. However, formal enforcement seems 
to offer better means for holding rule breaching individuals accountable as it 
through a third adjudicating party corrects the behavior of infringing individuals 
through formal means.
There is thus a formality aspect to rules, however no matter how formal a rule 
may be it has no constraining value unless a formal enforcement mechanism exist 
which is capable of holding  individuals directly accountable. 
 So far in this chapter we have discussed the features that  constitute a rule 
and the features that are necessary for a rule to have an impact. Despite discussing 
such features I have not examined and defined what type of phenomenon rules can 
be said to affect. Rules as I intend to treat them cannot directly affect the behavior 
of individuals as individuals are assumed, in the rational literature, to be 
maximization seekers. Instead, the point of departure in this thesis will utilize 
another of Ostrom’s arguments, namely that rules affect the ”[...] structure of a 
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situation in which actions are selected” (Ostrom, 1986: 6-7). Thus, by affecting 
the structure of an action situation, and following the definition of rules, it  can be 
argued that rules state which actions individuals are required and prohibited to 
take. Logically  rules then also tell the involved individuals which actions that are 
permitted. 
 To summarize, rules can be said to embrace a rationality component. This is 
since, rules constrain the full set of individuals in a specific institutional action 
situation which leads the rules to create greater predictability  of the behavior on 
the part  of the individuals because of their existence (Peters, 2012: 53).Thus, 
individuals will be willing to submit to the rules, despite their constraining nature, 
as rules also create incentives. Further, rules do not directly affect individuals 
behavior but rather the structure of an situation where actions are to be taken and 
policy produced. Another important aspects of rules is the formal enforcement. 
Should the results demonstrate that  no formal enforcement mechanism has been 
established one could, hypothetically, imagine that  if individuals were not to gain 
from following the rules then they  would defect from the rules and collective 
action problems would occur. Based on the above exploration of institutional 
constraints one can deduce the following hypothesis;
H2: Should formal rules which regulate the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
exist, undergo change, or new rules be created, subject to formal enforcement, the 
expectation would be that the prescriptions shape and change policy.
 
 Finally, what rules should I then empirically investigate in order to 
operationalize the above hypothesis? The rules, as defined above, should be of a 
formal nature and affect a situation where action is to be taken. Accordingly, it is 
regulated in the Treaties that the European Council has and still does play a 
central role in prescribing guidelines for the Union’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, as a consequence of this I shall argue for, in the analytical 
chapters, that the European Council’s guidelines plays a major role in prescribing 
the policy actions available when formulating  policy towards the Middle East 
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peace process. Because of this an examination of the guidelines shall guide my 
analysis of institutions functioning as a set of rules.
4.1.2 Principal-Agent Theory & Contractual Relationships
The previous chapter discussed and recognized institutions as formal rules that 
limit individual’s choices in an policy action situation. However, as shall be 
explored in the empirical chapters, it is not only individuals that are involved in 
the foreign policy process in the European Union. Therefore, it become essential 
to further extend the theoretical framework with a perspective that also include 
inter-institutional relationships and the potential consequences such relationships 
may induce on policy outcomes. Accordingly, the principal-agent (P-A) 
perspective on institutions seems as a sound theoretical alternative as the 
perspective employs a dual focus on both ”interactions among institutions, and 
between individuals and institutions [...]” (Peters, 2012: 56).
 The P-A perspective conceptualizes institutions as the relationship ”[...] 
whenever one actor (principal) engages another actor (agent) to perform a task on 
its behalf (Tallberg, 2003: 16). 
”The principal and the agent thus enter into a contractual agreement, in which 
the principal chooses to delegate certain functions or decision-making authority 
to the agent, in the expectation that the agent will act in ways that produce 
outcomes desired by the principal” (ibid,: 16). 
 Such a relationship in itself may not  seem as problematic, however, if we 
add to the equation the basic behavioral premise from rational choice theory, 
individual preference maximization, the relationship takes on a rather problematic 
form. Key to understanding the P-A literature, is the assumption that simultaneous 
information asymmetry and conflicting interests prevail within the relationship. 
Information asymmetry is caused due to the simple reason that agents generally 
know substantially  more about their own interest and goals than the principal thus 
creating difficulties for the principal to verify what actions the agent are taking 
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 58; Tallberg, 2003: 19). Conflicting interests are assumed to 
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exist as a principal who enters into a contractual agreement  with an agent expects 
the agent to work to attain and produce outcomes desired by  the principal. 
However, the agent is assumed to have interests of its own that it  seeks to attain 
and once the delegation of functions or decision-making authority  has occurred 
actions taken by the agent may very  well be driven by logics other than that  of the 
principal (Tallberg, 2003: 20-1). Furthermore, the delegation of functions and 
decision-making procedures to an existing agent is not the sole situation in which 
conflicting interests may take precedence in a contractual relationship. Moe 
(1990) argues that;
 
”Once an agency is created, the political world becomes a different place. Agency 
bureaucrats are now political actors in their own right: they have career and 
institutional interests that may not be entirely congruent with their formal 
missions, and they have powerful resources - expertise and delegated authority - 
that might be employed toward these ‘selfish’ ends” (Moe, 1990 cited in Tallberg, 
2003: 21).
 
Thus, in line with the basic behavioral assumption of the rational choice literature, 
individual preference maximization, it may be that ”while the principal would 
prefer the agent to perform the functions it has been delegated in accordance with 
the principal’s preferences, the agent may have private interests at 
heart” (Tallberg, 2003: 19). 
 By assuming that information asymmetry and conflicting interests take 
prevalence in the relationship between the principal and agent, P-A scholars draw 
the conclusion that the agent is likely to ‘shirk’. That is when the agent pursue its 
own preferences at the expense of the principals preferences as long as this 
behavior is not  rendered disadvantageous (ibid: 19; Scully, 2006: 25; Eisenhardt, 
1989: 61). Consequently, depending on the extent that agent withholds 
information and to the extent the agent’s interest  conflict with the principal’s 
interests the more problematic the contractual relationship will be.  
 As noted above, there are ways for the principal to render shirking 
unfavorable for the agent.   This can be achieved by deploying either of two 
overarching methods, monitoring/oversight or incentive/sanction mechanisms 
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(Tallberg, 2003: 22-3, McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984: 167). According to the 
principal-agent literature there are two ways the principal can monitor its agents, 
either by using a police-patrol (pro-active) or a fire-alarm (re-active) approach 
(McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984: 167). Further, the principal may also choose to 
reward behavior, on part of the agent, that complies with the preferences and goals 
of the principal or, on the other hand, sanction behavior that  do not (Tallberg, 
2003: 23).
 Based on the above investigation of principal-agent relationships I arrive at 
the following hypothesis:
H3: Should contractual relationships exist, or be created, policy should be shaped 
or change as a result of shirking on the part of the agent, unless it is rendered 
disadvantageous.
 As my concluding remarks to this chapter I intend to briefly  discuss how to 
operationalize principal-agent relationships. Due to the assumption that 
information asymmetry and conflicting interest exist between the two actors, it 
should be sufficient to examine the goals and interest  of the agent and compare 
these ideas to the policies produced. I am by  no means arguing that all of the 
interest and goals of the agent will be reflected in policy, but rather some of the 
goals and interest of the agent may be reflected in the new policy. However, I may 
very well be that the theory is refuted and the agent does not attempt to shirk. 
Placing the principal-agent relationship into the context of the European Union, 
there is especially one relationship, introduced with the entry into force of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, that  is of interest when analyzing the Treaty  reform and the 
CFSP. That relationship is the introduction of the High Representative for the 
CFSP (HR), as will be elaborated in the analysis, the introduction of the HR most 
certainly fit the theoretical definition of a contractual relationship, thus calling for 
an examination of the High Representative’s goals to determine whether these 
conflict with the contracting principal’s. The question thus become how one 
should determine whether conflictual goals exist or not. My approach to 
determine this shall be to examine and compare statements and strategies issued 
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by the High Representative. This is since these documents represent the formal 
mediums through which the HR attempts to help  formulate the Union’s foreign 
policy. However, as noted by Musu (2010) in the context of the Middle East peace 
process, the High Representative is a part  of the ‘Quartet on the Middle East peace 
process’ (ibid: 64) and as a consequence of being a part of the Quartet, few 
statements on the Middle East peace process are issued by the High 
Representative in solitude but rather jointly using the Quartet as the formal 
medium. Therefore, the analysis will rely on investigating ‘Quartet statements’ 
since these also represent the policy the High Representative attempts to pursue.
4.2 Normative Institutionalism
The ambitions with this chapter are to first to clarify between theoretical positions 
inherent in the constructivist metatheory concerning institutions. Secondly, it  is 
the ambition to explore and analyze ’normative institutionalism’ and how this 
theoretical perspective would argue institutions could shape and cause change in 
policy. Lastly, the deduction of a hypothesis on the basis of the analysis of theory 
will end with a operationalization strategy for the hypothesis. 
 Rather than jumping the gun there is an aspect that needs to be brought to 
the attention of the reader before moving on with the analysis of normative 
institutional theory. 
Within the constructivist institutional literature there seems to exist ambiguities 
concerning the usage of theoretical perspectives. My own reflection as to what 
might have caused these ambiguities is that these perspectives all belong to a 
single ‘meta-theoretical’ orientation, constructivism (Pollack, 2010: 24; Wiener, 
2006: 41). Within this orientation there are three perspectives that are similar but 
also distinct from one another, these are, normative-, constructivist- and 
sociological-institutionalism.To be sure, normative institutionalism, as the theory 
is labelled by Peters, is one of them and the preferred label utilized in this thesis.
 Following the ontological discussion in the ‘Philosophy of Science’ chapter, 
it should be no surprise to the reader that normative theory rejects the rationality 
of individuals (Peters, 2012: 29). Instead, the institutions are seen as social 
environments that affect the behavior of individuals through informal, norms, 
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values, understandings, and routines (ibid: 29-30). The logical question that 
follow such a vague definition of institutional constraints would be, what 
constitutes a norm? In this instance norms is to be considered as socially 
embedded values and rules which normatively impact members of an institution 
or institutional framework (ibid: 30; Wiener, 2006: 43). Correspondingly, 
individual’s preferences are assumed to be shaped through the participation in 
institutional life, institutions are, according to the normative institutional 
literature, assumed to express a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Peters, 2012: 27). That 
is, the institutional norms, values,  and understandings function as a reference 
point that not only  send a common message about what behavior is appropriate 
but also have the potential to cause the same appropriate behavior among every 
single individual member in the institution (Wiener, 2006: 43-4; Peters, 2012: 29). 
Put into the context of the European Union normative institutionalism can be said 
to emphasize ” [...]the behavioral impact of standards of appropriateness 
es tab l i shed by the Communi ty’s [EU’s] normat ive and pol icy 
commitments” (Thomas, 2011: 14). 
 The conceptualization of institutions as the expression of a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ is far from unproblematic. This is since by assuming that 
institutions send the same message to individuals, normative institutional theories, 
also assume that it is received by all institutional members in a uniform manner. 
As noted by Peters (2012) this is not always the case as ”we know, for example, 
that even in well-developed and long-standing institutions different people will 
read cultural signals differently and will define ‘appropriate’ in very different 
ways” (ibid: 32). Furthermore, as rules can be also be defined as norms, readers of 
this thesis could run the risk of confusing rules as defined by rational choice 
theory  with rules as defined by normative institutional theory. To make it  clear 
normative institutional theory do take rules into consideration, however,  the 
rational choice definition of rules and the normative version of rules are distinct 
from one another since;
”The rules may be imposed and enforced by direct coercion and political or 
organizational authority, or they may be part of a code of appropriate behavior 
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that is learned and internalized through [...] education” (March & Olsen, 1989: 
22)
 Accordingly, for the institutional ‘logic of appropriateness’ to function 
effectively there must be some form learning mechanism, in contrast to 
enforcement mechanism, which ensure that no individual defect from the 
appropriate behavior set out by the institutional norms and values. The argument 
is not very different  from that of the rational choice institutionalist one, however, 
instead of formal enforcement of rules and contractual relationships, the 
normative version, as demonstrated by the quote above argues for a more informal 
enforcement through a ‘socialization’ process (Peters, 2012: 38). To explicate 
further March and Olsen (1989) differentiate rules and enforcement from rational 
choice institutionalism by arguing that:
”[...] socialization into a set of rules and acceptance of their appropriateness is 
ordinarily not a case of willfully entering into an explicit contract. Rules, 
including those of various professions, are learned as catechisms of 
expectations” (March & Olsen, 1989: 23).
 The conceptualization of ‘socialization’ is thus meant to be understood as a 
process rather than a single event causing members to immediately adhere and 
comply with institutional rules and norms. This ‘socialization’ process, scholars 
argue, has occurred because of regular and repeated contacts between foreign 
policy-makers (Alecu de Flers et al, 2011: 169, Smith 2004: 33 & Glarbo 1999). 
For instance, Glarbo (1999) elaborates on this socialization process by  arguing 
that through regularized social interaction shared social realities are produced and 
stored within individuals (Glarbo, 1999: 639, see also Smith, 2000, Chekel, 2003: 
210). Thus, it is the social interactions, per sé, that cause alterations to 
individuals’ social realities and can therefore also be said to be the causing factor 
when social realities become integrated (ibid: 639), or in other words, when 
individuals adhere to the ‘logic of appropriateness’. Through regular interactions, 
Glarbo argues, individuals are expected to ”[...] establish meaning recursively [by 
self-reference] on the basis of their engagement in a mutual exchange [...]” (ibid: 
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640) with other individuals and thereby keep  track of his or her own behavior in 
accordance with the reactions of the other individuals within that social world or 
institution (ibid: 641). Consequently, the more regular the interaction patterns the 
more adherence to institutional norms and values one would expect as the 
individual would learn what behavior that is socially acceptable and thus act in 
accordance with the ‘logic of appropriateness’. In sum, ‘socialization’ should be 
seen as a process whereby members begin to learn the institutional norms and 
values during the participation in the institution (Juncos & Pomorska, 2006: 3; 
Lewis, 2005: 939).
 Following this, one would also have to assume that the ‘socialization’ 
argument would also be valid if norms, values are created or changed from a 
round of Treaty  reform. In the case of creating and establishing new norms or 
values, it is my argument that, each and every individual within the specific 
institutional framework in which the new norms or values are being established 
has to be considered as a novice member in relation to the new normative 
framework. Thus leading individuals participating in the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy  institutional setting to adopt policy that reflect and adhere to the 
established norms and values within the CFSP institutional framework. 
 A further important characteristic of normative institutional theory concern 
the degree of institutionalization. Within the normative institutional school of 
thought the norms and values have the potential of becoming ordinary and 
mundane (Peters, 2012: 31) to such a degree that individuals unconsciously 
comply with the normative framework. Such routinization and habitualization of 
institutions, it is assumed, could produce an effect on policy outcomes since: 
”[...] conscious commitment and conscious decision making are minimized. 
Individuals [thus] continue to respond in the ways expected, and needed, by the 
institution because they have become accustomed to doing so, and the various 
normative stance, as myths and stories associated with the institution, help 
reinforce that routinization” (Peters, 2012: 42 see also March & Olsen, 1989: 22). 
  Merging this perception of routinization to that of both Peter’s and Glarbo’s 
(1999) amongst others, routines are phenomena that occurs on a day-to-day basis, 
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will help in order to operationalize the concept. This is since one would 
hypothetically  think that if interactions in the form of meetings of foreign policy-
makers were to increase self-references of the individual’s behavior, compared to 
the other individuals present in the institution, would increase thereby leading 
towards greater adherence to appropriate behavior. As such, it becomes my task to 
investigate whether the each respective Treaty  reform has changed interaction 
patterns since if summits or meetings between CFSP policymakers become more 
frequent then we could expect greater norm diffusion in the Council of the 
European Union and other key CFSP institutions and policy should therefore to a 
greater extent reflect  normative values. On the other hand, if they become less 
frequent then policy  would change as to reflect less normative values. Thus we 
can deduce the following hypotheses from the normative strand of institutional 
theory:
H4: If regular interaction patterns exist, or are created, policy would be shaped 
by socially embedded norms.
H5: If socially embedded values are created or changed, policy-makers act in 
accordance with these norms thus allowing these norms to shape or change 
policy.
 To conclude the chapter on normative institutionalism a discussion on the 
operationalization of the perspective would seem suitable. As the criticism 
directed to normative institutional theory argued the ‘logic of appropriateness’ is 
far from a tangible concept thus making it difficult, but not impossible, to 
operationalize. Should the individuals involved in the foreign policy process in the 
European Union practice in accordance with the appropriate norms and values 
present within the Union. Accordingly, the policies produced as an outcome of the 
institutional practices should reflect the very  same values. Thus to operationalize, 
what needs to be analyzed are threefold. First, as member states have expressed, 
in the Treaties, their values (Thomas, 2011:14-5) an investigation of the Treaties is 
necessary  since this would establish which the norms and values are and whether 
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they  have changed with each respective Treaty reform. Secondly, an inquiry into 
the interaction patterns of the policy-making institutions is an integral part of the 
analysis. Such an inquiry is important as it would determine whether one would 
see the potential for policy to change or not. Imagine the following scenario, if 
interaction patterns are low  in frequency (or infrequent), norms and values would 
not be reflected in policy, as individuals would not be able to recursively reflect 
upon their behavior, in relation to that of the other individuals, and therefore not 
act in accordance with the ‘logic of appropriateness’. On the other hand, if 
interaction patterns increase with treaty reforms we would expect policy to a 
greater extent reflect the norms and values of the EU, since individuals would act 
on the basis of the reactions of the other individuals, in accordance with the ‘logic 
of appropriateness’. Further, should interaction patterns increase the argument is 
that routinization would increase and thereby minimizing conscious decision-
making which cause individuals to follow the ‘logic of appropriateness’ and cause 
policy to reflect the socially embedded values. Furthermore, it  is important to 
realize that since the foreign policymaking of the involves plenty of actors and 
socially embedded values may very have been socialized and used to shape and 
inform e.g. the objectives pursued by an agent. Finally, an empirical investigation 
of the actual policy is elementary, as this would either prove or dis-prove the 
claims made by the normative institutional theory.
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5. Analysis
The following chapters are in place to fulfill three purposes. First, the chapters 
aim to give the reader an understanding of the most important institutions related 
to the formulation of the Union’s policy towards the Middle East peace process. 
By using the Maastricht Treaty  as the starting point for such an investigation, I 
intend to use the successive treaties to build upon the model developed using the 
Maastricht Treaty. Secondly, the chapter also aims at exploring and identifying the 
institutional constraints  provided by the Treaties that theoretically  and 
hypothetically  could shape and change the direction of the Union’s peace process 
policy.Third, as I, by  arguing that institutional change should alter policy, assume 
that the Middle Eastern policy has been shaped and changed with successive 
Treaty reforms, an inquiry into the actual policy documents shall also form a part 
of this chapter. 
5.1 The Maastricht Treaty
The Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force in 1993, explicitly  stated that ”A 
common foreign and security policy is hereby established [...]” (Art. J, 
1992 ,Treaty on European Union). The Treaty  thereby became the first, in the 
Union’s history to incorporate provisions on a European foreign policy 
(Keukeleire & Macnaughtan, 2008: 50; Giegerich & Wallace, 2011: 435; 
Peterson, 2012: 216). Remaining in force till 1999, when the Treaty of Amsterdam 
replaced and amended Maastricht the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty 
brought about several institutional changes. 
 Because of the amalgamation of the Common Foreign and Security  Policy  
into the formal structure of the Union, it fell on the European Council to ”[...] 
define the principles of and general guidelines for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy” (Art. J.8, 1992, Treaty on European Union). Thence, the 
European Council plays a ”[...] pivotal role in the strategic direction, scope and 
main decisions of the Union’s foreign policy (Keukeleire & MacNaugthan, 2008: 
68). 
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 Second, the Maastricht transformed the former foreign policy institution 
’European Political Cooperation’ established in 1970 after the Hague Summit, to 
make CFSP a prerogative of the Council of the European Union (the Council) 
(Hix, & Høyland, 2011: 311-2; Keukeleire & MacNaugthan, 2008: 50). Under the 
Council formation ‘General Affairs Council’ member states’ foreign ministers 
were to decide on foreign and security  policy action and adopt common positions 
and joint-actions (Arts. J.2 §2, J.1 §3 respectively, 1992, Treaty on European 
Union; see also Hix & Høyland, 2011: 312), thus allowing the Council to have the 
final say in foreign policy  issues. Due to the internal composition of the General 
Affairs Council, the Common Foreign and Security  Policy was deemed as largely 
intergovernmental. Furthermore, the Council’s common positions required that 
member states implemented respective national policies in accordance with the 
defined EU position, although no formal sanctions for failing to comply  existed 
(Hix & Høyland, 2011: 312).  Joint  actions, on the other hand, address a specific 
situation and set out the objectives, means and conditions for its implementation 
in the member states (Art. J.3 §2, Treaty  on European Union), and are more 
extensive relative to the common position.
 Furthermore, as a consequence of introducing the foreign and security  
policy as a Council formation, the Council’s supporting institutional framework 
was also brought into the equation of shaping the foreign policy of the European 
Union. An important development related to this was the role granted to the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). COREPER II is 
composed of all member states’ permanent representatives dealing with foreign 
policy related issues (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 74). As established in 
the Council’s Rules of Procedure COREPER was tasked with the following:
”all items on the agenda for a Council meeting shall be examined in advance by 
COREPER unless the Council decides otherwise. COREPER shall endeavor to 
reach agreement at its level to be submitted to the Council for adoption” (Art. 19 
§1, Council Decision 93/662/EC).
When dealing with the Council agenda, COREPER usually  split it into two 
sections. The first section, A-points, are items already agreed by  the COREPER 
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and requires adoption by the Council (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006: 52). The 
second are B-points which need further discussion and debate among ministers in 
the Council before formal adoption (ibid:52).
 As demonstrated by  the quote above, COREPER thus came to play, and still 
is playing, an integral part of the formulation and decision-making of European 
foreign and security policy. 
 Though it can be argued that the European Commission could have played a 
role in the formulation of EU foreign and security by submitting proposals (Art. J.
8 §3, 1992, Treaty on European Union) and European Parliament through its 
budgetary powers (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 93), I have made the 
decision to exclude these from the analysis. This is since they could not, during 
the period the Maastricht  Treaty was in force, be seen as directly involved in the 
formulation and decision-making of the Union’s foreign and security policy. 
Letting this be my  final note as to the exploration of the key institutions in CFSP 
policy-making, there are a number of interesting theoretical observations that can 
be made. These observations will be developed below. 
 Realizing that, I have decided not to include a prior Treaty, as a comparison 
point, the purpose of this chapter is to outline which formal rules, norms, values 
and policy  that were in place under the Maastricht Treaty. This to enable me, in 
the coming chapters, to compare the different institutional innovations of each 
Treaty and whether they did have any  effect on policy. Though, for now, I aspire 
to divide the analysis of the Maastricht Treaty into two separate parts. The first 
focuses on norms and values while the second place an emphasis on what can be 
argued to be formal rules. 
5.1.1 Normative Institutions and Socialization through Interaction
The first interesting observation is that the Maastricht Treaty not only ingrained a 
set of values and norms but also established regular patterns for interaction that 
could have lead to socialization. The Maastricht Treaty established several values 
that the Union was to pursue when dealing with foreign policy issues. The Treaty 
makes it clear what socially  shared norms and values the Union’s  work and 
policies are to be framed around. The preamble in the Treaty state
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”Confirming their [the member states’] attachment to the principles of liberty, 
democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule 
of law” (Preamble, 1992 ,Treaty on European Union)
These values are reaffirmed and consolidated and placed into a foreign policy 
context under the provisions on a common foreign and security policy. Article J.1 
§2 determine that;
”The objectives of the common foreign and security policy shall be to [...] 
preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki 
Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter; to promote international 
cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Article J.1 §2, 1992, Treaty 
on European Union). 
Though the above quotes provide a satisfactory answer as to what socially 
embedded values that are established in the Treaty, there is a need to further 
clarify what the concept ”fundamental freedoms” actually  inhibit in the context of 
the peace process. If one reference the United Nations Charter, one can determine 
that the concept ”fundamental freedoms” is comprised of several rights. However, 
for analytical purposes, one of these rights are more important than the others. 
Consequently, I have limited the concept of ”fundamental freedoms” to solely 
comprised of the right of self-determination  (Art. 1, Charter of the United 
Nations). As will be presented in the analysis of policy, the right of self-
determination is key in the Union’s policy towards the peace process. 
 Thus, one can confidently establish that the Maastricht Treaty inhibit several 
socially embedded values such as democracy, the rule of law, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and the respect for international law. Still the 
mere existence of norms and values is, per definition, not a satisfactory condition 
for the adherence and socialization of these norms to occur. To satisfy  all of 
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theoretical conditions for socialization to occur one must consider whether regular 
patterns of interaction exist within the policy-making institutions, or not. 
 Several notable regular interaction patterns exist within key foreign and 
security policy-making institutions. A closer examination of the European Council 
summits show that during the Maastricht years, 1993-1998, the European Council 
met formally at the very  least twice per annum (European Council Website, 
European Council Conclusions Since 1975-1992 & 1993-2002). Thus, regular 
patterns of interaction in the European Council had already  been established and 
consequently one would expect that the conclusions, published following each 
summit, to reflect the embedded norms in the Maastricht Treaty. Further the 
General Affairs Council during Maastricht met roughly once per month (Hayes-
Renshaw, 2002: 50) or as data from 1994 suggest, 16 times per annum including 
domestic affairs (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 1997: 30). Hence making the 
Council an arena susceptible to socialization. However, the involvement of 
COREPER II in the policy-making process does also have implications for 
socialization. As Lewis (2005) notes, ”no other site of everyday EU decision-
making approximates the intensity of weekly COREPER negotiations” (Lewis, 
2005: 946). Following the logic, as presented by normative institutional theory, 
COREPER must be argued to be an arena where it is extremely likely  that 
socialization occur, especially when one consider that  COREPER should endeavor 
to reach agreement at their level. However, it would be naïve to assume that all 
common foreign and security policy decisions are taken at  COREPER. However, 
empirical studies have shown that most of the decisions on the Council’s agenda, 
are resolved at the level of COREPER. Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace (1997), for 
instance, argue that evidence from Council insiders points to around 85-90 per 
cent of the agenda items was transacted to the Council as A-points (ibid: 52) On 
the other hand, Häge (2008) estimate that circa 35 per cent of legal acts are voted 
on by the ministers in the Council and approximately 48 per cent are discussed by 
ministers (Häge, 2008 cited in Hix & Høyland, 2011: 63). Another noteworthy 
point related to socialization and the Council regard the involvement of permanent 
representatives in actual Council sessions in which the representatives, according 
to Lewis (2005) brief and offers tactical suggestions to the ministers (Lewis, 2005: 
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946), it is likely these norms are, whenever decisions are de facto taken in the 
Council of the European Union, reflected in the policy produced.
 In sum, through the embodiment of foreign and security  policy under the 
Treaty framework, common foreign and security policies should, at least 
theoretically, reflect the norms and values presented above. However, as theory, 
sometimes, is far fetched from reality, I shall after a discussion on formal rules 
investigate whether these norms and values are reflected in policy produced under 
the Maastricht Treaty. 
5.1.2 Formal Rules and Prescriptions under Maastricht
Although not formally recognized as an institution of the European Union, the 
European Council has played an important part in setting the strategic and general 
guidelines for foreign policy action.  
Written in the Treaty, ”The Council shall decide, on the basis of general guidelines 
from the European Council, that a matter should be the subject of joint 
action” (Art. J.3 §3, Treaty  on European Union), the Article makes it clear on just 
how integral the role of the European Council is in the formulation and 
prescription of foreign and security policy action. As understood by Keukeleire & 
MacNaughtan,”[...] it is its [the European Council’s] role as an ”organe 
d’impulsion” ’rather than as a decision-making actor that is most 
important” (Keukeleire & Macnaughtan, 2008: 68). 
 Related to hypothesis two’s theoretical discussion it is my argument that 
these general guidelines in fact prescribe what actions in a policy situation that are 
required, prohibited and permitted. These ‘guidelines’ or rules, as they are being 
theoretically referred to, provide the basis of defining and prescribing the 
decisions taken by  the Council of the European Union (Article J.8 §2, Treaty on 
European Union). The guidelines should, if Ostrom’s arguments are consistent 
with the empiricism presented in the policy  chapter, constrain the Council as to 
which options on their policy choice agenda are required, prohibited and 
permitted leading to an impact on the final policy output. It thus become 
mandatory to further scrutinize the guidelines to determine whether these are 
reflected in policy or not. 
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 However, also important to recognize is that the Treaty include no 
provisions regarding formal enforcement of the European Council’s guidelines. 
Thus, one would expect that the Council also attempt to pursue its own objectives 
and preferences when defining policy, perhaps rendering the European Council’s 
prescriptions obsolete. 
 The first European Council, to offer some substance on the Middle East 
peace process policy, after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, was the 
1993 Brussels summit conclusions. The conclusions from that meeting offered an 
extensive ”framework for joint action” (European Council Conclusions, 1993, 
Brussels). Identified in this document are several prescriptions concerning what 
decisions the Council are to take and implement as the Union’s official line of 
policy.
”strengthening the democratic process, including through assistance, if requested, 
with the preparation and monitoring of the elections to be held in the autonomous 
Palestinian Territories” (European Council Conclusions, 1993, Brussels)
”consolidating peace through building regional co-operation [...] with a view to 
contributing to economic development and security in the Middle East.” (ibid)
”supporting the Palestinian Interim Self-Government authority to be established 
[...] through the rapid, efficient and transparent implementation of European 
Union aid programmes for the development of the Occupied Territories, in close 
consultation with the Palestinians.” (ibid)
 The above quotes advance interesting theoretical links to contemplate on 
further. First, it  seems as if the socially embedded values in the Treaties have been 
socialized as they are reflected in the European Council’s conclusions. Because of 
this I argue that  the European Council’s prescriptions, or guidelines, at the very 
least attempts to crystallize the socially embedded values by  more specifically 
prescribe what types of decisions the Council is to take. A telling example of this 
would be the socially  embedded norm of support of democracy, which the 
European Council prescribe should be pursued through the monitoring of the 
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elections and through establishing aid programmes for the establishment of a 
democratic government. Second, the aforementioned quotes provides the Council 
with specific prescriptions on which actions the European Council conclude are, 
at the very  least, required for the Union to take in order to contribute to the Middle 
East peace process. 
 At subsequent summits the European Council further consolidated their 
approach adopted at Brussels. For instance in Essen 1994 the European Council 
by further extending its aid programmes. 
”The European Council agreed that, as the largest international donor, the 
European Union should continue to make a significant economic and political 
contribution in support of the Middle East peace process, in particular in the 
reconstruction of the Palestinian areas.” (European Council Conclusions, 1994, 
Essen)
The European Council’s conclusions did not only consider process elements 
which prescribed the range of policy action available to the Council towards the 
Middle East conflict. At the Florence summit in 1996 the European Council 
defined, for the first time since the Maastricht Treaty entered into force, the 
Union’s position on how to accomplish a lasting peace. The European Council 
recalled the essential principles on which the conclusion of a final peace 
agreement should be based on the principles of ”[...] self-determination for the 
Palestinians, with all that implies, and land for peace - are essential to the 
achievement of a just, comprehensive and durable peace.” (European Council 
Conclusions, Florence, 1996). The emphasis placed on the right  of self-
determination of the Palestinians as a key principle of the European Council’s 
guidelines for policy  towards the Middle East peace process must be considered 
yet another reflection of the socially  shared values. Though the Maastricht Treaty 
does not make self-determination an explicit principle, which the Union is to 
promote in its external relationships, the Treaty would label it  a ’fundamental 
freedom’ (see previous section on socialization during Maastricht). More 
specifically, the support of the right of self-determination stem from the devotion 
to the principles laid out in the United Nations charter.
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 Another rule, or if you will, prescription issued at Florence concerned an 
important policy  choice related to the security paradigm of the peace process. This 
time the European Council specified that
”The European Union considers important the commitments the parties have 
made regarding security [...] It condemns all acts of terrorism and will continue to 
support the parties in their fight against it, its perpetrators and its political, 
economic and social causes.” (European Council Conclusions, Florence, 1996). 
Though already  concluded, at the Brussels summit in 1993, that the Union’s 
policies should be aimed at the development of security it remained unclear what 
elements that was connected to security. However, at the Florence summit it 
became clear that efforts concerning security  were to be related to the hindrance 
of acts of terrorism. 
 To conclude, it is highly interesting to note, despite summit intensity being 
as low as two times per year, that  socially embedded values established in the 
Treaties had been indoctrinated in the European Council’s conclusions. On a 
similar note, the conclusions, I would argue, operate as a form of crystallization 
tool whereby the European Council formulate and operationalize the socially 
embedded norms. For instance at the Brussels summit in 1993 the European 
Council concluded that  as a means of promoting, or strengthening, the democratic 
process in the Palestinian territories would through monetary assistance seek or 
political aid to monitor the elections crystallize the commitment to democracy as 
an embedded value. Further, the European Council’s conclusions are of a rather 
abstract nature, though as seen from the above analysis there are conclusions 
prescribing what policy action the Council, or EU, should adopt. Also highly 
relevant and important, for theoretical purposes, is the absence of any  form of 
formal enforcement mechanism in the Maastricht Treaty, because of this, as 
discussed in the theoretical chapter on institutions as rules, the European 
Council’s guidelines, at least in theory, provide little prescriptive value. This is 
since individuals holding the final decision-taking power, in this case the Council 
of the European Union, would be able to overlook these prescriptions and would 
thus, as they are assumed to be egoistic, pursue their own goals. However, 
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whether the policy  adopted during the Maastricht era did reflect  the European 
Council’s prescriptions will be established in the coming chapter analyzing the 
actual policy measures adopted by the Council of the European Union. 
5.2 Middle East Peace Policy during Maastricht
The European Union’s policy  adopted during the Maastricht era provides plenty of 
captivating information that can be used to make inferences concerning what 
institutional constraints that were triggered to, in this first case, shape the Union’s 
policy towards the Middle East peace process.   
 Let us start in April 1994 when the first joint action (Council Decision, 
94/276/CFSP) of the Council of the European Union towards the Middle East was 
adopted. Several of the above mentioned norms and rules adopted seems to have 
guided the Council when adopting the final policy document. First and foremost, 
policy during Maastricht seems primarily motivated by the principles of 
democracy, human rights and rule of law. This becomes particularly  evident in 
joint action 94/276/CFSP where it is declared that the Union is to ”use its 
influence to encourage all the parties to support the peace process unconditionally 
[...] and work for the strengthening of democracy  and respect for human 
rights” (Art. 1, Council Decision, 94/276/CFSP). Concerning concrete measures, 
the Union was to materialize its socially  embedded values, democracy and the rule 
of law, by aiding the Palestinian authorities in an attempt to establish a Palestinian 
police force (ibid, Art. 3). On the basis of joint action 94/276/CFSP (ibid, Art. 5), 
as a consequence of its promotion of human rights and the strengthening of 
democracy, and in line with the European Council’s prescriptions at the Brussels 
summit in 1993, the Union adopted in 1995 further concretized policy measures 
concerning the support to observe the Palestinian Council elections (Council 
Decision, 95/403/CFSP). The measure adopted by the Council is a strong 
indicator on how the Union’s policy was during Maastricht shaped by  socially 
embedded values, support of democracy and the promotion of the rule of law in 
the Union’s external relations. However, policy  also reflect the prescriptions set 
by the European Council on how to realize and materialize the support of 
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democracy  and rule of law in concrete terms, e.g. supporting elections and 
creating a police force. 
 Yet another example of how the Council’s guidelines has shaped the 
direction of policy  can be found in Common Position 14/94. The Common 
Position identifies the need to establish financial cooperation with the Palestinian 
Occupied Territories with the aim to support inter alia infrastructure, education, 
health and improvement of public administration institutions related to the 
advancement of democracy  and human rights (Council Common Position, 14/94). 
Intriguingly, once again it  is possible to find a link between the Union’s policies 
adopted and the social norms embedded in the Maastricht Treaty. Nevertheless, it 
is intriguing to empirically establish how the European Council’s guidelines 
function to materialize the shared values by prescribing what concrete policy 
action that should be pursued on part of the Council of the European Union. Yet, it 
is not only the above empiricism that demonstrates and evidence such a 
crystallization of socially shared norms.
 In late 1995 additional policy was adopted directed towards the peace 
process. The policy, named the Barcelona declaration, was an attempt by  the 
Union to establish a multilateral regional relationship with countries around the 
Mediterranean with the aim of creating an area of peace and stability as a further 
tool to ”[...] support the realization of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace 
settlement in the Middle East [...]” (Barcelona Declaration, 1995: 2). Furthermore, 
the objective creating an area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean, and thus 
indirectly the Middle East conflict, would require ”[...] a strengthening of 
democracy  and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and 
social development [...], which are all essential aspects of partnership” (ibid: 2).
 The establishment of the Barcelona declaration is in it own right a telling 
example of how the European Council managed to shape the Union’s policy 
approach towards the Middle East peace process, especially  when one considers 
the policy  guidelines established at the Brussels  summit in 1993. Despite being 
an interesting policy  in its own right, the Barcelona declaration is also a reflection 
of how socially embedded values and norms did shape the Union’s policy  towards 
the Middle East peace process under the governing structure of the Maastricht 
Treaty. Empirical evidence also provide evidence that socialization and adherence 
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to the logic of appropriateness took place during the policy-making process. 
Perhaps the most clear empirical evidence, of a socialization process actually 
occurring, can be found in the document’s ”political and security partnership” 
provisions. These provisions stated that the parties subject to the provisions were 
to undertake action to; 
”develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems, while 
recognizing in this framework the right of each of them to choose and freely 
develop its own political, socio- cultural, economic and judicial system” (ibid: 3)
”respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and guarantee the effective 
legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms[...].” (ibid: 3)
”respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting in 
conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations 
and with the relevant norms of international law [...]” (ibid: 3)
Thus, following the analysis in the normative chapter, due to the regularized 
patterns of interaction both in the Council and COREPER it is possible to infer 
that there exist a causal relationship  between socially embedded values 
established in the Maastricht Treaty  and the adopted policy approach in the 
Barcelona declaration. Recollect that  the Treaty established that the Union should 
in its relationships with the external world develop and consolidate democracy, 
the rule of law, the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Hence, 
the three above quotes clearly demonstrate the manner in which socially 
embedded values formed and shaped the policy  in the Barcelona declaration 
which was indirectly aimed at the Middle East peace process. 
 Furthermore, the Barcelona declaration also encompass the European 
Council’s prescribed ambition to consolidate and secure peace in the Middle East 
through regional economic cooperation and development (ibid: 4). Thus, policy 
cannot be accredited to be shaped on shared values alone but also on the 
prescriptions given by the European Council as governed by the Treaty. 
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 Another policy  paradigm of importance to the peace process, as 
acknowledged by  the European Council at the Florence summit, was security. 
Recall that it was prescribed at Florence that  the Union condemned all acts of 
terrorism and should work to combat all of its social, economic and political 
causes. In April of 1997 the formal decision to adopt policy mirroring the 
prescriptions of the European Council was taken. The joint action (97/289/CFSP) 
did not only consider combating terrorism a key  objective, but also the promotion 
and education of human rights. In Article 2 it is clearly stated that; 
”The objective of the programme is to support the PA’s [Palestinian Authority’s] 
capacity to counter terrorism and help sustain the Middle East Peace Process and 
to provide the relevant security and police services with a comprehensive 
understanding of the principles of human rights in the implementation of their 
activities in the territories under the control of the PA” (Art.1 §2, 97/289/CFSP).
Hence, I would argue, that this piece of policy provide further evidence that  policy 
was rather norm driven during Maastricht, and that European Council’s guidelines 
serve to materialize the socially  shared norms and values crystallizing them into 
concrete policy measures.
 To summarize the analysis of the policy adopted under Maastricht it  is 
possible to infer that due to regularized patterns of interaction in the main CFSP 
policy-making institutions, policy was formed and shaped around common values 
and norms. Following the above analysis empirical evidence supporting such a 
conclusion would be the Union’s ambition to promote democracy and the rule of 
law by providing the Palestinian authority  with assistance to establish a police 
force. Another example of this would the acknowledgement of the Union in the 
Barcelona declaration that the Palestinian and Occupied Territories do have the 
right of self-determination. However, as already mentioned above, it would be 
naïve to assume that policy was shaped solely on norms and values. The above 
empirical analysis suggest that the European Council’s guidelines function as to 
materialize and crystallize the socially shared values and norms in to concrete 
policy measures.  Also noteworthy  is despite lacking a formal compliance 
mechanism, which was key in Ostrom’s argumentation, policy seems to have been 
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shaped by the European Council’s guidelines. Thus, the European Council’s 
prescriptions should also be accredited with shaping the Union’s policy  towards 
the Middle East peace process. 
5.3 The Amsterdam & Nice Treaties
The first Treaty reform amending Maastricht was the Amsterdam Treaty. Entering 
into force in 1999 the Amsterdam Treaty made interesting amendments that 
potentially could have altered the EU’s policy towards the Middle East peace 
process. Perhaps most interesting was the amendment of Article 18 (Art. 18, 1997 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union; ex Art. J.8) which 
established the position of a High Representative for the CFSP. 
 Also important was the consolidated role of the European Council, still 
remaining at the centre of EU foreign policy making. On a similar note, the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives’ involvement in foreign policy 
remained, at large, the same as under the Maastricht Treaty (c.f 1999/385/EC), 
which meant that no extension to the interaction patterns with Amsterdam did 
occur. However, with the adoption and entry  into force of the Nice Treaty, as will 
be developed below, interaction patterns did change as a consequence of the 
creation of a new institution tasked with policy formulation.
5.3.1 Changes to Socially Embedded Values and Interaction Patterns?
The adoption and entry  into force of the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties brought 
about little change   with regard to the socially  embedded values and norms of the 
Union. Instead, both Amsterdam and Nice reaffirmed the Union’s commitment to 
the socially embedded norms written in the Maastricht  Treaty. Thus, EU foreign 
policy towards the peace process should, assuming that normative institutional 
theory  correspond with its assumptions, be shaped by  the shared values to 
preserve peace and international security, to promote international cooperation 
and to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms (Art. 11, 1997 Consolidated Version of the 
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Treaty on European Union; Art. 11, 2002 Consolidated Version of the Treaty  on 
European Union; ex Art. J.1).
 However, an important institutional innovation established by the Nice 
Treaty, was the introduction of the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The 
Committee which was tasked with 
”monitor[ing] the international situation in the areas covered by the common 
foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by 
delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own 
initiative.” (Art. 25, 2002 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union)
The PSC, as argued by  some scholars, replaced COREPER to become the linchpin 
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 
74; Juncos & Reynolds, 2007: 136) though the role of COREPER, officially, 
remained the same (c.f 1999/385/EC). Nevertheless, comprised of national 
permanent representatives, the PSC met approximately twice per week 
(Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 74) thus adding to the frequency of 
regularized interaction, compared to when the Maastricht Treaty was in force as 
COREPER II was the only supporting structure meting on a weekly basis.
 Furthermore, with the introduction of the Amsterdam Treaty the European 
Council summit meeting frequency  was intensified to four formal summits per 
year (European Council Website, European Council Conclusions Since 1993-2002 
& European Council Conclusions Since 2003-2013), which according to 
normative institutional theory mean that norms should be more discernible in 
shaping the European Council’s summit conclusions as well as the policy of the 
Union. Additionally, the ‘General Affairs Council’ was with the Nice Treaty 
renamed to become the GAERC, or ‘General Affairs and External Relations 
Council’ seeing, at least, in 2004 an intensification in meeting frequency to no less 
than 26 meetings (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006: 38), as compared to the 
previous approximation of once per month or as data suggested 16 times per year. 
Thus, one could argue that the Treaty reforms altered the frequency of meetings. 
Due to this one would expect policy to be more shaped around the shared values 
and norms. 
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 To summarize, the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties did not bring about any  
extraordinary  changes to the governing structure of the CFSP in terms of new 
socially embedded norms and values. However, the Nice Treaty did introduce 
another arena for the definition and formulation of foreign policy meeting 
regularly and frequently. Also, the intensification of summits on part of the 
European Council and the Council would lead to the expectation to empirically 
find that the Union’s policy  towards the Middle East peace process would take 
further consideration of the socially embedded norms written in the treaty 
become, as a consequence of regular interaction patterns, catechisms expected to 
be reflected in final policy. Nevertheless, since the socially embedded norms and 
values underwent no major changes the expectation according to hypothesis five 
would be that policy should remain similar to that during Maastricht.
5.3.2 The European Council still setting the prescriptive rules for foreign 
policy?
Concerning treaty reform and the European Council’s involvement in the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties 
introduced no institutional innovations that  altered the role of the European 
Council as the ”organe d’impulsion” of the CFSP. This can be established by 
looking at Article 13 of both the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties where it  is stated 
that, ”The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining a and 
implementing the common foreign and security policy on the basis of the general 
guidelines defined by the European Council” (Art. 13 §3, 1997 Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty  on European Union; Art. 13, 2002 Consolidated Version of 
the Treaty  on European Union; ex Art. J3). Thus, the Amsterdam and Nice 
Treaties, in terms of changing the formal rules prescribing policy action altered 
little since the role of the European Council remained intact at the level of 
providing the guidelines on which the Council should base its policy. Accordingly, 
the European Council’s conclusions, must thus still be considered to prescribe the 
direction of the Union’s policies aimed at the Middle East peace process. Though 
important to note is that there exist no formal mechanism through which the 
European Council could enforce the Council’s obligation to base its decisions on 
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the European Council’s guidelines thus allowing the Council to defect from its 
obligation. However, to determine this another investigation of the European 
Council’s prescriptions is a must in determining whether these Treaties shaped or 
changed the Union’s policy towards the peace process. 
 Beginning the analysis with an analysis of the Berlin summit in 1999, the 
European Council issued its first guidelines under the governing structure of 
Amsterdam. Interestingly, some policy  aspects concluded at the Berlin summit 
changed the European Council’s approach to the Middle East peace process. For 
instance instead of reaffirming the Union’s position on the right of the Palestinians 
people to self-determination the European Council extended its position to include 
”[...] the creation of a democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian State 
[...]” (European Council Conclusions, 1999, Berlin). Other than the directional 
change made at the Berlin summit in 1999, the European Council’s prescriptive 
guidelines remained on the same path as during Maastricht. Several examples of 
this can be found in the forthcoming European Council conclusions issued ex post 
the Berlin conclusions. At the Gothenburg summit in 2001 it was consolidated that 
aid aimed at supporting Palestinian institution building and economy should 
remain an EU commitment as to ensure peace in the Middle East,
”[...]aid to the Palestinian institutions and economy remains a European 
commitment we should maintain as part of an international effort.” (European 
Council Conclusions, 2001, Gothenburg)
Thus, precisely as prescribed at the Brussels summit in 1993, aid to the 
Palestinians was and still is, according to the European Council, a central policy 
domain on how the European Union is to approach the Middle Eastern peace 
process. 
 Another prescription established by the European Council already during the 
Maastricht era  that  remained part of the European Council’s approach to the 
peace process was that of the security  paradigm, specifically terrorism. The 
Thessaloniki European Council in 2003 consolidated the path the European 
Council had determined already at the Florence summit 1996. 
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 ”the European Union unequivocally condemns terrorism and will continue to 
contribute to efforts aimed at cutting off support, including arms and financing, to 
terrorist groups. It is also ready to help the Palestinian authority in its efforts to 
stop terrorism, including its capacity to prevent terrorist financing” (European 
Council Conclusions, 2003, Thessaloniki)
A further key objective to achieve peace in the Middle East identified by  and at 
the 1993 European Council summit  in Brussels was the establishment of the rule 
of law in the Palestinian territories. An objective that, in 2003 at the Thessaloniki 
European Council, was yet again emphasized 
”It [the European Council] reaffirms its readiness to support the Palestinian 
Authority in taking responsibility for law and order, and in particular, in 
improving its civil police and law enforcement capacity. (European Council 
Conclusions, 2004, Brussles)
Interestingly, the European Council also remained convinced that the concrete 
way to ensure the rule of law was through the improvement of the capacity of law 
enforcement through the improvement of the Palestinian civil police force. It can 
thus be argued that the prescriptions issued by the European Council when the 
Amsterdam and Nice Treaties were in force, most certainly, demonstrate and 
provide evidence that the formal rules shaping the Union’s policy did not change 
but rather remained on the same path sine the European Council identified these 
objective under the governing structure of the Maastricht Treaty.
 In sum, when developing hypothesis two I argued that  if the formal rules 
changed, or if new rules were created, one would expect policy  to change. 
However, as demonstrated above the formal rules, or prescriptions, issued by the 
European Council changed very little from those issued when the Maastricht 
Treaty was in force, thus the expectations on policy changing due to the European 
Council’s prescriptions are slim. Though new to the European Council’s 
prescriptions was the aim of creating a democratic Palestinian state living side by 
side with Israel. In the context of the effect the Treaty reforms had on changing 
the prescriptions governing how policy  was shaped I argue that  the 
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implementation of Amsterdam and Nice Treaties affected little as the European 
Council still remained as the ”organe d’impulsion” of the policy  prescriptions 
issued. Moreover, it is further interesting to observe that  the European Council 
still function as an arena to crystallize the socially embedded norms into concrete 
policy, as, perhaps best, evidenced by the quote where the Union’s adherence to 
promoting the rule of law is turned into the improvement of law enforcement 
capacities. Despite the fact that the above analysis did not find evidence pointing 
to either a change or establishment of new formal rules it is all too soon to discard 
the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties as changing the course of the Union’s policy 
towards the Middle East peace process. Remember, at the development of a 
theoretical framework that  several hypotheses were developed and should 
therefore be tested. Consequently, I shall move the analysis forward to test the 
third hypotheses regarding contractual relationships to determine whether the 
agent of such a relationship has been able to introduce new policy  approaches that 
may have caused a change in the Union’s peace process policy.
5.3.3 The High Representative, A Shirking Agent?
When established in 1999, the first titleholder of High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy became Javier Solana the former Spanish 
foreign minister. The establishment of the HR for the CFSP is a theoretically 
interesting institutional innovation, especially considering the role awarded to the 
High Representative
”The [...] High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, shall 
assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the common foreign and 
security policy, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation 
and implementation of policy decisions [...]” (Art. 26, 1997 Consolidated Version 
of the Treaty on European Union; ex Art. J.16)
 This role description of the High Representative and that individual’s 
involvement in the Union’s foreign policy, I argue, conform with the definition of 
a contractual relationship. The principal, or in this case the Council, have 
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delegated policy preparation and formulation functions to the High Representative 
with the expectations that the individual fulfilling that role produces outcomes 
desired by  the Council. However, as suggested by principal-agent theory, the 
agent is assumed to pursue goals in her or his own interest which may not be 
congruent with those delegated by  the principal. At least theoretically  the High 
Representative should pursue his or her own goals at the expense of the Council’s, 
unless the Council render such behavior disadvantageous. Interestingly enough no 
such monitoring or incentive mechanisms are found in the Articles providing the 
legal basis for the HR nor in the Treaties at all (c.f. Arts. 18 §3 & 26, 1997 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union). 
 Furthermore, the HR for Common Foreign and Security issues was not  only  
part of the endogenous institutional framework of the European Union, but was 
also a part of the ‘Quartet on the Middle East peace process’ (Musu, 2010: 64) 
established at the Madrid Conference in 2002. The Quartet consisted, and still 
does, of the High Representative of the European Union, the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the 
Secretary of State of the United States of America (ibid: 64). Solana’s membership 
in the Quartet is deeply interesting for one particular reason, the Quartet could, 
precisely as the European Union, function as a socialization arena where different 
socially embedded values are present. If socialized, the High Representative could 
pursue other goals, and thus shirk, whilst playing an integral part of the CFSP 
policy-making chain. Thus, through the participation in the Quartet the High 
Representative could be exposed to other logics that could be in contrast with that 
of the Council’s already adopted policies under the Maastricht Treaty. However, 
rather than assuming that the High Representative pursued goals of his own, it is 
necessary  to establish whether the HR pursued other goals than those already 
established in policy and determine whether these goals were concretized in 
policy, thus determining the introduction of the High Representatives did alter the 
course of the Union’s policy towards the peace process. By analyzing statements 
made by the Quartet and a strategy put forward by  the High Representative it is 
my ambition to test whether the hypothesis deducted from principal-agent theory 
congrue with the empirical material.
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 The analysis will proceed as follow. Since, the previous sections have dealt 
with institutions as either shared socially embedded values or prescriptions 
regulating which actions that are required, permitted or prohibited to take, this 
chapter will follow the same structure. Hence, first  the values pursued by the HR 
will be analyzed. Second, the prescriptive measures will be placed at the centre of 
attention and examined. These two steps are crucial to the analysis as they would 
establish whether any  discrepancies exist, between the Union’s policy  pursued 
during Maastricht and the goals advanced by the HR, determining whether 
shirking occurred or not.
 When analyzing the statements made by the High Representative, using the 
Quartet as a medium, and deducting what socially  embedded values that are 
adhered to there are several notable insights that provide empirical evidence 
suggesting that  the HR did not  shirk. Early on it was identified and established 
that the promotion and development of democracy in the Palestinian territories 
would be a key objective of the High Representatives approach. 
”Implementation of an action plan, with appropriate benchmarks for progress on 
reform measures, should lead to the establishment of a democratic Palestinian 
state characterized by the rule of law, separation of powers [...]” (Quartet 
Statement, New York, 2002)
Interestingly  enough the previous quote does not only point to the prominence 
given to the promotion of democracy, but does also emphasize a shared 
commitment to the rule of law. These are valuable observations as they  indicate 
that the HR, through the medium of the Quartet, share similar and the very same 
socially embedded values as those embedded in both the Maastricht, Amsterdam 
and Nice Treaties promoted by  the EU which would imply that no shirking 
occurred.
 Further empirical data testifying which normative goals the High 
Representative were pursuing can be found in the ”Road Map for Peace in the 
Middle East” delivered by the Quartet in 2003. In the Road Map  it is stated that 
peace can only be achieved as long as the Palestinians are willing to end violence 
and terrorism by establishing a practicing democracy which should be based on 
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tolerance and liberty (Quartet Road Map, 2003: 1), which, again, does not conflict 
with the established policy  goals of the European Union. Following the 
deliverance of the Road Map for Peace in the Middle East much of the 
forthcoming Quartet statements were framed around the same objectives as laid 
out in the Road Map and does not provide any further noteworthy empirical 
evidence. However, supplementary examples of the social values pursued by the 
High Representative for the CFSP can be identified in a joint strategy paper 
written in 2007 by the HR and the Union’s Commissioner for External Relations 
at the time. Named ”Statebuilding for Peace in the Middle East: An EU Action 
Strategy” (Solana & Ferrero-Waldner, 2007), the joint paper provides further 
empirical evidence that the normative objectives adopted by the High 
Representative does not conflict  with those pursued by the Union. Among the 
most important measures to achieve peace, identified by the HR, is the 
establishment of a democratic Palestinian state (ibid: 2). Hence, in terms of 
normative values pursued, the perspective adopted by the High Representative lies 
close to the policy adopted by the Union during the period the Maastricht Treaty 
was in force as well as the European Council’s guidelines examined above. 
Nonetheless, the normative values pursued represents only part of the analysis 
whether the introduction of the High Representative changed the course of the 
Union’s policy towards the Middle East  peace process. Consequently, the 
following subsection shall examine the policy prescriptions the High 
Representative endeavored to implement. 
 Examining the prescriptive measures the High Representative sought to 
employ in his task to formulate the Union’s policy towards the peace process, one 
realize that neither the prescriptions formulated by the High Representative infer 
that shirking came about. Among the indicators manifesting that shirking did not 
occur is the joint commitment to a two-state solution. Recall that it was 
established, by the European Council, in 1999 that the Union should work 
progressively  towards a two-state solution in order to achieve peace. In 2002 the 
High Representative, using the medium of the Quartet, set for himself the same 
goal. ”The Quartet remains committed to implementing the vision of two states, 
Israel and an independent viable and democratic Palestine living side by  side in 
peace and security [...]” (Quartet Statement, New York, 2002).
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 What is further interesting with the above quote is the ambition to 
democratize Palestine, a socially  shared value that, for instance, the European 
Council already in 1993 sought to pursue. Further empirical evidence suggesting 
that the theoretical premises of principal-agent theory did not apply to the 
introduction of the High Representative is discernible in the security paradigm of 
the peace process policy. Here it is evident that the HR builds on previous 
European Council conclusions, for instance Florence 1996 and Thessaloniki 2003, 
to consolidate the fight against terrorism;
”The Quartet and the international community are prepared to intensify their 
engagement with the Palestinians to restore momentum on the roadmap,
[...]ensure security and stability in Gaza and the West Bank from which Israel 
withdraws, prevent all acts of terrorism, and ensure the dismantlement of armed 
terrorist groups” (Quartet Statement, New York, 2004)
Further required policy action in the security paradigm was the introduction of a 
democratic police force. Identified already in 1994 (c.f. 94/276/CFSP), and 
reaffirmed at the Thessaloniki and Brussels European Councils in 2003, as a key 
policy objective, the HR also re-adopted a similar approach;
”Supporting the establishment of modern and democratic police forces [...]. Our 
assistance to the civil police will be complemented by wider support to the rule of 
law, including helping to establish an efficient penal and judiciary 
system” (Solana & Ferrero-Waldner, 2007: 2)
Also noteworthy is the emphasis placed on the wider support of the rule of law, by 
establishing that it is required to setup an efficient judiciary  system. At first  sight 
this might suggest that the HR actually  attempted to extent  the prescriptions and 
policy of the Union. However, recalling that  as a consequence of the Union’s 
socially embedded values in the Maastricht Treaty, it was already put into concrete 
policy measures. The development of an efficient judicial system was a necessity 
to achieve peace, in the Barcelona declaration in 1995, hence again suggesting 
that the theoretical and hypothesized predictions derived through principal-agent 
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theory  did not congrue with empiricism. However, what is interesting to observe 
in the above quote is also the materialization of the normative value ‘rule of law’. 
In a similar manner as the European Council crystallized the Union’s shared 
values into concrete prescriptions, does the High Representative pragmatize the 
support of the rule of law. 
 Leaving the security  paradigm and moving back to focus on general policy  
prescriptions issued by the High Representative when the Amsterdam and Nice 
Treaties were in force. Already spelled out as an objective of the EU, to support 
the Palestinian Authorities in their quest for institutional reform towards 
democracy, was to donate financial resources (c.f. European Council Conclusions, 
1994, Essen; Common Position 14/94). The installation of the High 
Representative came not  to change the course of this ambition either. A distinct 
example of this can be derived from the following quote;
”The Quartet emphasizes the need for the international community to play a vital 
role in providing additional financial support to the Palestinians, which is 
essential in order to support needed reforms[...](Quartet Statement, London, 
2005)
To summarize this subchapter, there is plenty empirical evidence inferring that the 
High Representative did not attempt to pursue prescriptions, or goals, and values 
other than those already  promoted by the European Council, and the European 
Union’s policy  towards the Middle East  peace process. Consequently, one must 
deem the treaty reform introducing the High Representative having little effect 
during the Amsterdam and Nice Treaty eras. This is since hypothesis three 
assumed that  with the introduction of a contractual relationship  the agent, or in 
this case the HR, would attempt to pursue goals other than those of the principal. 
Following the analysis in the above section, it was empirically established that the 
High Representative did not attempt to pursue values, norms, prescriptions or 
policy other than those already implemented when the Maastricht Treaty was in 
force. However, what will be interesting to investigate further in the coming 
chapters, concerning the Lisbon Treaty, is if the role of the High Representative 
changed and did, during the initial years of Lisbon, attempt to shirk. 
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5.4 Middle East Peace Policy during Amsterdam & Nice
Since the analysis above made it clear that  despite the institutional innovations 
made by the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, policy prescriptions and norms 
seemed to have remained largely the same as those pursued under the Maastricht 
Treaty. Due to this one would also assume the policy adopted to remain largely the 
same as that adopted during Maastricht.
 Empirically, there are several examples that confirm the above assumption. 
For instance, only a couple of months after the entry into force of the Amsterdam 
Treaty the Council adopted a decision (Council Decision, 1999/440/CFSP) where 
the Union’s commitment  (c.f. 97/289/CFSP) to assist the Palestinian Authority  in 
stopping terrorist activities stemming from its territories was reaffirmed. In 2000 
the commitment to end terrorist activities was yet again extended where it, just as 
in the 1997 joint action, was reaffirmed that not only an end to terrorism that was 
necessary but also;
”[...] provid[ing] the relevant security and police services with assistance and 
training that are fully compatible with the principles of human rights and respect 
of the rule of law.” (Art. 1 §2, Council Decision, 2000/298/CFSP)
The above quote, I would argue, demonstrate how the adherence to the socially 
embedded values are materialized into concrete policy  measures. Besides 
empirically  proving that norms shaped the Union’s policy  decision 2000/298/
CFSP also demonstrate that the prescriptions issued, though the Council’s 
decision was issued three years prior to the reaffirmation at  Thessaloniki in 2003, 
that the European Council’s prescriptions shaped the Union’s policy towards the 
peace process. Further empirical examples of the Union’s adherence to the 
socially shared norms and formal prescriptions  and rules can be found in the 
Union’s declaration of its policy objectives when extending the mandate for its 
”Special Representative for the Middle East peace process”. It  is explicitly made 
clear that;
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”The mandate of the Special Representative will be based on the policy objectives 
of the European Union regarding the Middle East peace process[...]. These 
objectives include: a two-State solution with Israel and a democratic, viable, 
peaceful and sovereign Palestinian State living side-by-side [...]. (Art.2 § (a), 
Council Decision, 2002/965/CFSP).  
It becomes rather evident that  the prescription established at the European Council 
summit in Berlin, 1999, that the Union should pursue a two-state solution has 
been realized as a policy goal. Moreover, the previous quotation further 
demonstrate the consequence the regularized interaction patterns and adherence to 
the socially shared norms had on policy. This is since it was explicitly  stated in the 
Treaties that the Union is ”to develop  and consolidate democracy and the rule of 
law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Art. 11, 1997 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty  on European Union; see also Art. 11, 2002 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union; ex Art. J.1) when 
exercising its foreign policy towards the Middle East peace process. Further 
empirical evidence suggesting both that policy, as a direct consequence of no 
change to socially  embedded values, and that policy to some extent was norm 
driven can be found in Article 3 of 2002/965/CFSP where it is expressed that the 
Special Representative in fulfilling his/her role should;
”engage constructively with signatories to agreements within the framework of 
the peace process in order to promote compliance with the basic norms of 
democracy, including respect for human rights and the rule of law” (Art.3 (g), 
Council Decision, 2002/965/CFSP).
 Another prescripted policy action concluded by the European Council, that 
demonstrate that policy  remained on the same path (c.f. European Council 
Conclusions, 2001, Gothenburg; Common Position, 14/94), concerns offering 
financial assistance to the Palestinians in their quest for statehood. By maintaining 
that aid to the Palestinians as an ambition, the policy adopted by  the Union also 
came to reflect this. In 2004 the Council, in tandem with the Parliament, adopted 
regulation 669/2004/EC, whereas to;
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” [...] prevent any further deterioration of the Palestinian economy by 
contributing to the sound management and budgetary equilibrium of the 
Palestinian Authority and to consolidate that Authority by means of institutional 
reinforcement” (Regulation, 669/2004/EC).
This is a clear indication that the policy of the Union towards the peace process 
still maintained on the same course as during the policy implemented when the 
Maastricht Treaty governed CFSP policy making. Moreover, there are still further 
empirical indicators suggesting that policy continued down the same path as the 
already established policy objectives as a consequence of the European Council 
remaining as the ”organe d’impulsion” and socially  shared and embedded values. 
Recall that at the 2003 Brussels European Council summit it  was concluded that 
the Union should continue in its work in aiding the Palestinian Authority 
establishing the rule of law as an important part to establish peace in the Middle 
East. When, in 2005, the mandate of the Special Representative of the Union to 
the peace process was extended, another objective was also added to the list  of the 
Union’s policy goals. That policy goal reflected the importance of the European 
Council’s guideline issued at Brussels in 2003 in shaping policy by stating that the 
Union shall have as its goal ”the establishment of sustainable and effective 
policing arrangement under Palestinian ownership” (Art.1, Council Decision, 
2005/796/CFSP). Furthermore, during that same year, the Union took further 
measures to live up to that specific goal, this time it  became evident that  the 
establishment of policing arrangements in Palestine was not only a consequence 
of the European Council’s guidelines but also a crystallization of the shared 
commitment to support democracy  and  the rule of law. The concretization of 
norms becomes evident as the Joint Action states that;
”[...] the support of the EU to the Palestinian Civil Police aims at increasing the 
‘safety and security’ of the Palestinian population and at serving the domestic 
agenda of the Palestinian Authority in reinforcing the rule of law” (Preamble §5, 
Council Decision, 2005/797/CFSP)
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The above quote clearly exhibit, how the different institutional constrains work to 
shape the Union’s policy  towards the peace process. For instance, as a 
consequence of the adherence to the socially  embedded norms, the Union’s 
policies reflect an ambition to strengthening the rule of law in the Palestinian 
areas. However, as argued in the previous section the European Council’s 
conclusions function as a form of crystallization of the norms turning them into 
concrete policy measures, in this case by offering support to the Palestinian police 
force. 
 Despite only including policies up till 2005, the analysis demonstrate well 
the overall approach of the Union’s policy  towards the Middle East peace process, 
in terms of prescriptions and normative institutional constraints. Policy from 2005 
to 2009 did reflect the very  same ambitions as those written of in this section and 
were therefore excluded. 
 To conclude the analysis of policy during the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, 
there are a few empirical observations that are highly  interesting to speak further 
of. First, despite the theoretical promises of the introduction of a contractual 
relationship, argued for in hypothesis three, the establishment of the High 
Representative did not lead to shirking and consequently policy did not change, 
accodingly  did the theoretical promises not congrue with empiricism. Second, the 
creation of a new interaction space, in the form of the Political and Security 
Committee, norms did not change and therefore one would not either expect a 
policy change due to this. However, empiricism still suggest that policy is 
reflective of norms but these norms are the same as previously. Third, as argued in 
hypothesis two, should the formal prescriptive rules be changed one would also 
expect policy to change. However, since neither Amsterdam nor Nice altered the 
role of the European Council, as the ”organe d’impulsion”, and the empirical fact 
that the European Council did not change its prescriptions, provided for policy 
reflected the same ambitions and aspirations as previously. Though it should be 
added that there is one more Treaty to analyze thus rendering this analysis 
representative of only the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties.
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5.5 The Lisbon Treaty
The final Treaty constituting a part of this analysis, and was the most recent to 
reform the Union’s foreign policy  system, was the Lisbon Treaty. Entering into 
force on December 1st of 2009, it consisted of two separate parts, one still named 
”Treaty on European Union” (TEU) the other ”Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union” (TFEU). However, what has the Lisbon Treaty meant Treaty 
meant for the Union’s policy towards the peace process? Has any  radical changes 
occurred or should our theoretical premises argue for policy following the same 
path as during the previous Treaties? This is precisely what this chapter aims at 
examining. Through initially  looking at whether any institutional constraints 
changed I then seek to determine whether these changes caused any changes to the 
Union’s policy. Before moving to the analysis a small confession regarding a 
slight shortcoming in this chapter is necessary. The confession relates to the fact, 
due the Lisbon Treaty only entered into force four years ago, that empirical data is 
limited and therefore it is difficult to discern which of the institutional constraints 
that shaped the Union’s policy  towards the Middle East peace process under the 
governing structure of the Lisbon Treaty. Despite this shortcoming, data 
concerning the testing of all institutional constraints are available, though the 
analysis should be considered somewhat limited. On that note the time has come 
to start the analysis. 
5.5.1 The Lisbon Treaty, extending the Union’s normative framework and 
interaction patterns?
When analyzing the impact the Lisbon Treaty had on the normative framework of 
the Union one can definitely determine that no major overhauls occurred. This 
becomes evident as one study Article 21 of the TEU closer; 
”The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles 
which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it 
seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality 
and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human 
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dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of 
the United Nations Charter and international law” (Art. 21, 2008 Consolidated 
Version of the TEU)
Thus, one can confidently determine that, in terms of changes to the normative 
values of the Union, the Lisbon Treaty  reform did alter little. Due to this, and the 
the theoretical premises in hypothesis four, the Union’s policy should continue to 
be crystallized and framed around the same normative preconditions as the 
previous Treaties hence, at least hypothetically, causing policy  to remain on the 
same course as reflected by the previous Treaties.
 More interestingly, was a new institutional innovation causing the 
interaction patterns of the Union, in regards to the policy making structure of the 
CFSP, to increase. Article 27 §3 of the TEU provided for the creation of a 
supporting institution to the High Representative, the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) (Art. 27 §3, 2008 Consolidated Version of the TEU). The role 
given to the EEAS is an important one considering the implications it could have 
on socializing the normative framework and shaping the Union’s policy. The 
EEAS was tasked with the following; 
”The EEAS shall support the High Representative in fulfilling his/her mandates as 
outlined [...] in fulfilling his/her mandate to conduct the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy of the European Union including the Common Security and 
Defence Policy, to contribute by his/her proposals to the development of that 
policy, which he/she shall carry out as mandated by the Council and to ensure the 
consistency of the Union’s external action” (Art. 2, Council Decision, 2010/427/
EU).
Thus, because of the role granted to the EEAS, it plays a central role in the 
formulation of the Union’s external policies and thus also the policy towards the 
Middle East peace process. When continuing the analysis by looking further at the 
High Representative’s role, during Lisbon, the policy formulation role of the 
EEAS will become more evident. Furthermore, the interaction patterns at the 
EEAS is almost at a daily level inasmuch as sixty percent of the officials working 
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there are hired as ’European Officials’ a permanent basis (Art. 6 §9, Council 
Decision, 2010/427/EU).  
 Turning the attention to the Council of the European Union, it becomes 
evident that interaction patterns remained similar as compared to the previous 
three Treaties. With the Lisbon Treaty the GAERC configuration was replaced 
with the ”Foreign Affairs Council” (FAC) (Art. 16 §6, 2008 Consolidated Version 
of the TEU). Concerning interaction patterns, empirical data shows that the FAC, 
since its creation in 2009, met 52 times which is an average of 13 meetings per 
year, slightly more than once a month (Council of the European Union Website). 
Furthermore, the interaction patterns at the European Council, not taking into an 
account the extra-ordinary meetings, remained at four formal summits per annum 
(European Council Website, European Council Conclusions Since 2003-2013). 
 Following the analysis above I come to the following conclusion, despite 
the Lisbon Treaty reform innovated a new arena for regular interaction, the EEAS, 
which was tasked with aiding the High Representative in formulating the CFSP 
policies, much of the goals pursued by  the HR, prior to the implementation of the 
Lisbon Treaty, reflected the socially embedded values pursued by  the Union in the 
Treaties. Hence, as these norms were already socialized and the normative 
framework remained intact the expectation would be that the same norms would 
continued to be reflected in the Union’s policy towards the peace process. 
Furthermore, the same goes for the European Council and the Council of the 
European Union which, despite the Lisbon Treaty reform, did not make any 
major alterations to their interaction patterns. 
5.5.2 Never changing formal rules and prescriptions
Despite innovating new institutions, such as the EEAS, the Lisbon Treaty did not 
make any altercations to role played by the European Council. Still, the European 
Council were to function as the impeller for foreign policy action as it  was written 
in Article 22 of the TEU;
”The Council [of the European Union] shall frame the common foreign and 
security policy and take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing it 
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on the basis of the general guidelines and strategic lines defined by the European 
Council” (Art. 26 §2, 2008 Consolidated Version of the TEU). 
Thus, under the circumstances introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, the European 
Council guidelines still remained as prescriptions which the Council must take 
into consideration when making policy decisions regarding CFSP action. Hence, 
to be able to answer the research question posed at the beginning of this thesis yet 
another examination of the European Council’s summit conclusions must be done. 
Since this last part of the analysis span over approximately  four years, as already 
mentioned, the empirical material is rather limited, something certainly reflected 
when analyzing the European Council’s summit conclusions. The sole conclusions 
on the Middle East peace process was issued on September sixteenth of 2010. 
Perhaps not surprising by now, they did not offer any new prescriptive rules that 
offered any new constraints on policy. This becomes evident when the European 
Council presents its overall strategy and final goal for the peace process;
” The European Union stresses that these negotiations on all final status issues 
should lead to a two-state solution with the State of Israel and an independent, 
democratic, contiguous and viable State of Palestine living side by side in peace 
and security”  (European Council Conclusions, 2010, Brussels)
Again, it is possible to see that the prescriptions issued at  the 1999 Berlin 
European Council summit  has remained on the prescriptive policy agenda of the 
European Council. Furthermore, it is rather evident that because of socialization 
of the collective norms, it is a democratic Palestinian state that is a required 
outcome of the peace process. Further empirical evidence suggesting that the 
European Council’s prescriptions has not changed, thus inferring that policy 
should not change, concerns the European Council’s ambition for the Union to 
maintain its role as a donor for the Palestinians; 
”The European Union is the first donor to the Palestinians and a crucial political 
and economic partner of both parties as well as their neighbours. In this regard, it 
stresses that the European Union will remain actively engaged and involved 
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including through the Quartet, to support and ensure the success of the 
negotiations [...]” (ibid)
Thus, as prescribed by the quotation above, Union policy is permitted to include 
the ambition to remain a donor and actively involved in the agreement of a peace 
settlement. These ambitions has previously already been concluded by  the 
European Council, at the Essen and Gothenburg European Council summits (c.f. 
European Council Conclusions, 1994, Essen; European Council Conclusions, 
2001, Gothenburg), as key to the Union’s policy towards the peace process. 
Unfortunately, these are the only clear-cut policy prescriptions the European 
Council concluded at its summit. However, there is another interesting quote 
mentioned in the document which emulate previously mentioned ambitions that 
can, more loosely than prescriptions, point to which aspirations the European 
Council had for the Union’s policy under Lisbon. The declaration states that;
”It [the European Union] also stresses the crucial importance of the continuation 
of the Palestinian State building process which the European Union will continue 
to actively support, [...]” (European Council Conclusions, 2010, Brussels)
Though ”state building” is quite an ambiguous concept, previous statements 
issued by, for instance, the European Council has inter alia pointed to the 
importance of securing the rule of law through building an effective and fully 
operational Palestinian police force (c.f. European Council Conclusion, 2003, 
Brussels). A further indicator, though already  mentioned, is the establishment of a 
democratic state system in Palestine (c.f. European Council Conclusions, 2010, 
Brussels). Other than that it is difficult to distinguish what specifically is meant by 
supporting state building efforts, however, the policy adopted might provide 
clearer answers to this question. 
 This section has provided empirical evidence demonstrating that as a 
consequence of maintaining the European Council as the prescriptive impeller for 
the EU’s foreign policy  action little of the policy prescriptions issued has actually 
changed. This would consequently  imply  that the concrete policy measures 
adopted by  the European Union would resemble those already in place stemming 
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from prior Treaties. However, as the European Council’s prescriptions is only  the 
second theoretical variable, derived from viewing institutions as a set of rules, 
demonstrating that no change has occurred there is still one remaining variable as 
well as the policy  adopted to be examined before drawing the conclusion that 
policy did not change. Though it is at least  theoretically and hypothetically true 
that one should not expect policy to look any different.
5.5.3 Introducing the EEAS, would the High Representative continue down 
the same path?
The contractual relationship between the HR for the CFSP and the Council 
remained intact under the structure of Lisbon, though at this point the person 
fulfilling the role was no longer Javier Solana but duchess Catherine Ashton. 
Despite the changing the person executing the office of High Representative it is 
not arduous to see that the role conferred upon the High Representative is one 
where her/his individual goals could be pursued and shirking could occur; 
”The High Representative shall conduct the Union’s common foreign and security 
policy. He shall contribute by his proposals to the development of that policy, 
which he shall carry out as mandated by the Council. The same shall apply to the 
common security and defence policy” (Art. 18 §2, 2008 Consolidated Version of 
the TEU) 
Furthermore, no formal mechanism in the Treaties was in place to render 
inappropriate behavior, shirking, disadvantageous on part of the High 
Representative. Thus, the governing structure introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, in 
theory, allowed for shirking, hence rendering an analysis of the High 
Representative’s goals a necessity in order to answer the research question posed. 
 Further interesting, related to the role of the HR, is the relationship between 
the representative and the EEAS. Since I argued above that the EEAS plays a 
central role in the formulation of the CFSP and thus function as a normative 
socialization arena which, according to normative institutional theory, could affect 
the High Representative’s goals, since the EEAS could contribute with normative 
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policy goals to CFSP issues thus affecting the role of the High Representative. 
However, as previously analyzed, the HR’s pursued goals towards the Middle East 
peace process, did already contain normative elements rendering an assessment of 
the implications of the EEAS somewhat obsolete. Notwithstanding this is still the 
necessity to analyze the goals of the HR. Due to the High Representative still 
being a part of the Middle East Quartet, statements issued using this medium will 
be used as representing the empirical material demonstrating what goals the HR 
pursued.
 The overall impression of the statements issued by  the High Representative, 
using the Quartet  as her medium, is that they are extremely  close to, if not the 
same as, the European Council’s prescriptions, as well as the collectively shared 
norms pursued by the Union in its external relations. In a statement issued on 
March 19 2010, the HR also adhere to the overall goal that the ”[...] negotiations 
should lead to a settlement [...] and results in the emergence of an independent, 
democratic and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security 
with Israel and its other neighbors” (Quartet Statement, Moscow, 2010). Already 
concluded at the Berlin European Council summit in 1999 (c.f. European Council 
Conclusions, 1999, Berlin), this policy  objective had long been seen as the overall 
objective of the peace process of the Union. This is a valuable observation as the 
quote demonstrate that a key objective of the European Council is also a key 
objective to the High Representative. 
 Supplementary  empirical observations that  infer equal conclusions concerns 
the rule of law and the improvement of the Palestinian Authority’s law 
enforcement capacity. In the Moscow issued statement the Quartet;
”[...] calls on the Palestinian Authority to continue to make every effort to 
improve law and order, to fight violent extremism, and to end incitement. The 
Quartet emphasizes the need to assist the Palestinian Authority in building its law 
enforcement capacity” (Quartet Statement, Moscow, 2010)
 The intention to support  the Palestinian Authority in improving its law 
enforcement capacity had long been on the agenda of the Union (c.f. 94/276/
CFSP; European Council Conclusions, 2003, Brussels) despite it  not appearing as 
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an explicit goal in the European Council conclusions stemming from when the 
Lisbon Treaty was in force. This policy prescription, though issued by the Quartet, 
indicate that the HR share similar goals to that of the Union and thus do not 
attempt to cultivate goals of her own on the policy formulation agenda when 
developing the foreign policies of the European Union.
”The Quartet further calls on all states in the region and in the wider 
international community to match the Palestinian commitment to state-building by 
contributing immediate, concrete, and sustained support for the Palestinian 
Authority [...]” (ibid).
Shifting focus to examining the norms pursued by  the High Representative these 
also lie close to those emphasized and adhered to by the EU. Already  mentioned, 
in the first quote examining the High Representative’s goals, was the ambition to 
create a democratic Palestine. Hence, the promotion of democracy  must be 
deemed as a normative value advanced by the High Representative too. 
Furthermore, democracy is not the sole normative value promoted by the HR that 
can be distinguished, for instance at a statement issued in September 2010 one can 
discern that human rights is also a normative value advanced; 
”The Quartet urged a complete halt to all violence and reiterated its call on all 
parties to ensure the protection of civilians and to respect international 
humanitarian and human rights law” (Quartet Statement, New York, 2010)
Thus, the High Representative’s normative ambitions lie close to those of the 
promoted by the Union in the Treaties. A last example, which certainly refutes the 
theoretical expectations derived from principal-agent theory, concerns the HR’s 
ambition to promote the establishment of law and order as stated in the Quartet’s 
Moscow statement from 2010 (c.f. Quartet Statement, Moscow, 2010).
 In summary one can certainly argue that the theoretical and hypothetical 
promises of the introduction of a contractual relationship were not fulfilled. 
Despite the theoretical possibility for the High Representative to shirk, it is still 
quite clear that  the High Representative did not  shirk. Both the prescriptive policy 
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measures and the normative values pursued and advanced by the HR lie close to 
the policy  goals either already made into concrete policy  under the previous 
Treaties or the prescriptions, pursued by  the European Council, and the normative 
framework established in the Lisbon Treaty. Furthermore, the emergence of the 
EEAS could have had implications for the policy goals sought after by the High 
Representative. However, since several institutions, e.g. COREPER II and the 
Foreign Affairs Council, with frequent interaction patterns were already 
established it is difficult to discern any difference the introduction the EEAS had 
on the High Representative’s agenda. Accordingly, the expectation for the Union’s 
policy is that it would at large remain the same as during the previous treaties. 
5.6 Limited policy under Lisbon
As already mentioned above, the empirical data available for analyzing the 
Union’s policy under Lisbon is limited. Consequently, this may render the analysis 
of the Union’s policy fragmentary. Notwithstanding this, there exist  a few policy 
documents that, partially, can demonstrate what policy the Union decided to 
follow through and implement. 
 Following another extension of the European Union’s special representative 
to the Middle East peace process it becomes evident that  the European Council’s 
1999 Berlin summit ambition (c.f. European Council Conclusions, 1999, Berlin) 
to establish a democratic Palestinian state still remained a priority  for the Union. 
In the Council decision extending the special representative’s mandate it is 
emphasized that  the mandate is based on the Union’s policy and that the 
objectives of that policy include;
”a two-state solution with Israel and a democratic, viable, peaceful and sovereign 
Palestinian State living side by side within secure and recognized borders 
enjoying relations with their neighbours [...]” (Art. 2 §2(a), Council Decision, 
2010/107/CFSP)
Thus, the prescriptions issued by the European Council, as regulated by the 
Treaties, seems to shape the Union’s policy in accordance with the governing 
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structure of Lisbon. Another example demonstrating both how the Lisbon Treaty 
and the consequences of not reforming the policy formulation role of the 
European Council is the Union’s continued ambition of establishing a Palestinian 
police force as part of their state building process. 
”the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under 
Palestinian ownership in accordance with best international standards, in 
cooperation with the Union’s institution building programmes [...]” (Art. 2 §2(e), 
Council Decision, 2010/107/CFSP)
This ambition had, as already explored, at least since 2005 (c.f. Council Decision, 
2005/797/CFSP) been a part of the Union’s approach to securing the goal of 
establishing a Palestinian state. Under Lisbon the ambition was reaffirmed 
through the extension of the same programme not only once but thrice (Council 
Decision, 2010/784/CFSP; Council Decision 2011/858/CFSP; 2013/354/CFSP). 
Other than these policy measures adopted by the European Union as part of the 
Common Foreign and Security  Policy, it  is difficult to denote further measures 
adopted. 
 Despite it being difficult to denote further concrete policy measures 
empirical data provide evidence that the socially  shared normative framework to 
some degree still shaped the Union’s policy. For instance, among the objectives of 
the special representative of the EU to the Middle East peace process was to;
”engage constructively with signatories to agreements within the framework of 
the peace process in order to promote compliance with the basic norms of 
democracy, including respect for human rights and the rule of law” (Art. 3 §(g), 
Council Decision, 2010/107/CFSP)
Unfortunately, further examples than these cannot be discerned in the Union’s 
policy due to the lack of empirical data available. However, it gives at least an 
idea that  the shared norms stemming from the Treaties were, at the very least, 
considered when mandating the special representative with the objectives 
originating from the Union’s policy (ibid).
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 To conclude this section, one must deem the Lisbon Treaty  to continue 
shaping the Union’s policy down the same path as the previous treaties. Despite 
the maintaining of the contractual relationship between the High Representative 
and the Council empirical evidence suggest that the HR pursued the same goals 
and shared norms established either by the European Council or the Lisbon Treaty. 
Among the empirical evidence proposing that the Union’s policy  remained the 
same is the objective of establishing a democratic Palestinian state. Already 
advanced as a priority for the Union at the 1999 Berlin European Council summit, 
the objective remained a priority under Lisbon.    Another of these examples 
would have to be the ambition of the Union since 1994 (c.f. Council Decision, 
94/276/CFSP) to create a Palestinian police force something that also remained a 
part of the Union’s concrete policy under the structure of Lisbon. Thus, as a 
consequence of not reforming the role of the European Council as the impeller of 
the CFSP, no changes to policy took place. Lastly, since the Lisbon Treaty, just as 
the past Treaties, did not alter anything concerning the normative commitments 
entrenched in the Treaty, the normative side of the policy remained similar to that 
of the other cases. However, the reader should be aware of the shortcomings 
regarding the empirical data and hence too broad generalization cannot be made 
based on the analysis of the policy under Lisbon.
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6. Conclusion
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate how the Treaties has shaped and 
changed the European Union’s policy towards the Middle East peace process. To 
be able to accomplish this task it was necessary to examine what structural 
features of the Treaties that had the potential to shape and change the Union’s 
policies. Subsequently to identifying and hypothesizing which institutional 
constraints that could shape and change the Union’s policy it  was essential to 
identify the  institutional constraints within the Treaty framework of the Union, 
which all of the hypothesized constraints did and exploring whether the 
constraints left any  mark in either shaping or changing the Union’s policy  towards 
the Middle East peace process. This final chapter presents the findings in relation 
to each of the deduced hypotheses and will also discuss suggestions for future 
research. 
6.1 Did the Treaties shape or change the Union’s policy?
 The claim that structures could shape and change policy has, interestingly 
enough, in the context of this thesis, only partially been fulfilled. This is since, the 
empirical material demonstrates that no substantial changes to the Union’s 
approach took place after the respective Treaty reforms. However, a minor  but yet 
important observation that the empirical material allows for is the change in the 
approach to the right of self-determination. Prior to the 1999 European Council 
the approach to the solution of the Middle Eastern conflict of the Union was to 
emphasize the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people. However, after 
the Berlin summit in 1999 both policy and the European Council’s conclusions 
remained on the path set at Berlin. Thus, to summarize whether any changes  to 
the Union’s policy  occurred with the Treaty reforms the answer has to be negative. 
This is largely a consequence of the Treaties not reforming and altering the role of 
key policymaking institutions and actors. For instance, in hypothesis two (H2) it 
was argued that should the formal rules regulating the CFSP change one should 
expect the policy to change as well. However, since neither of the Treaty reforms 
altered the role of the European Council in issuing foreign policy prescriptions 
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that the Council were to base the policy on, the policy did not changes besides in 
the extraordinary case mentioned above. Furthermore, hypotheses four and five 
(H4 & H5) argued, if regularized interaction patterns exist, should the socially 
embedded and shared values and norms change policy would also change as a 
consequence of policymakers acting in accordance with the logic of 
appropriateness. However, since the normative framework established in the 
Treaties did not change with the respective Treaty reform the policy of the Union 
continued down the same path from the Maastricht Treaty to the Lisbon Treaty. 
Most interesting of all the institutional innovations that, according to principal-
agent theory, should have caused a change in the direction of the Union’s policy 
towards the peace process was the introduction of the High Representative for the 
Common Foreign Security  Policy. Unfortunately, despite the promises of 
principal-agent theory  and hypotheses three (H3) the introduction of a contractual 
relationship  did not have any  implications for the Union’s policy  in the Middle 
East peace process.
 In terms of coming to a conclusion concerning how the Treaties has shaped 
the Union’s policy  there are plenty of highly  interesting observations that can be 
made. Among the most interesting, in my opinion, was the empirical observations 
linked to hypotheses four (H4) and five (H5). The hypotheses claimed, if 
regularized interaction patterns exist  and socially  embedded values exist 
individuals would act in accordance with the logic of appropriateness and policy 
would be shaped in line with the shared norms. To be sure, the Union’s policy was 
rather norm driven. Among the most explicit examples of norms being 
incorporated in the Union’s policy was the commitment to diffuse the rule of law 
and democracy in the EU’s relations with the rest of the world. Already in 1994 
(see inter alia, 94/276/CFSP) the Union made it explicitly clear that  in its 
ambition to disseminate democracy and the rule of law they were to build a 
Palestinian police force. This brings me to another intriguing point concerning the 
socially shared norms and values. During the exploration of the European 
Council’s prescriptions it was possible to discern how the norms was used as a 
point of departure to materialize and crystalize concrete policy  prescriptions on 
what actions that were required to take on part of the EU. 
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 Considering the formal rules argued for in hypothesis two (H2), or 
prescriptions, and their role in shaping the Union’s policy one must also, on the 
basis of the empirical findings, deem these to have played an substantial role in 
shaping the policy adopted. Among the most typical examples of prescriptions 
shaping the Union’s policy  was the decision to support the establishment of a 
Palestinian police force (see inter alia, European Council Conclusions, 2004, 
Brussels), to combat terrorism (see inter alia, European Council Conclusions, 
1996, Florence) and the ambition of a two-state solution to the conflict (see inter 
alia, European Council Conclusions, 1999, Berlin). 
  When it comes to the introduction of the High Representative it is difficult  
to argue that the contractual relationship did matter for the shaping of policy. This 
is since the theoretical preconditions governing hypothesis three (H3) held that 
with the introduction of a contractual relationship it is likely  that the goals of the 
two actors in the relationship will clash. However, by analyzing the statement 
issued by the High Representative using the Quartet  for the Middle East  peace 
process as a medium it became evident that no shirking on the part of the High 
Representative did occur. Hence, the goals of the High Representative was mere 
reflections of those already established by the European Council and the socially 
embedded norms. 
6.2 Future Research
The empirical investigation in this thesis has also laid the ground for me to 
propose future areas of research. The empirical inquiry clearly demonstrated that 
despite institutional innovations, such as the introduction of a contractual 
relationship, the policy  adopted under the governing structure of the Maastricht 
Treaty remained at  large the same despite Treaty reforms. This observation makes 
it extremely relevant to ask the question whether the historical selection of 
institutions or policy have any implications for locking policy to be path 
dependent thus rendering policy change difficult?
 Another area that would be interesting to pursue future research in relates to 
regularized interaction patterns. In this thesis, I perhaps, naïvely infer that if 
regularized interaction patterns exist policy  would be shaped in accordance with 
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the logic of appropriateness. However, in hindsight it would be highly  relevant 
and also interesting to examine whether the quality, instead of quantity, of the 
regular interactions matters more when it comes to socialization into a set of 
norms and values embedded in, for instance, more in socializing and diffusing 
embedded norms. 
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